

EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE INTERVENTION (CVI) PROGRAMS IN TWO OHIO COUNTIES



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SUBMITTED TO

Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services

AUGUST 31, 2026

This publication was supported by a grant from the Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services (OCJS). Its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of the OCJS. This project was supported, in whole or in part, by the U.S. Department of Treasury, State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF) program. The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) or contributor(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Treasury. References to specific individuals, agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author(s), contributor(s), or the U.S. Department of Treasury.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nationally, violent crime significantly increased in urban areas across the United States in the years following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 (Rosenfeld & Lopez, 2022). This increase was followed by an equally pronounced decline in violent crime beginning in 2024 in many major cities and has continued to plummet to record-setting lows in homicides and violent crime (Lopez & Boxerman, 2026). The specific reasons for these declines are the subject of much political and scholarly debate, particularly related to the effectiveness of specific violence reduction strategies, such as community violence intervention (CVI) (CCJ, 2026; Greene, 2026; McDonald & Friedrich, 2026).

CVI refers to a range of community-led strategies designed to reduce violence by addressing the individual, social, and environmental factors that contribute to it (McManus et al., 2020). CVI strategies vary considerably across jurisdictions, but many share several common features, including focusing resources on the small number of individuals and locations at greatest risk, employing trusted community members or “credible messengers,” using data and community knowledge to identify and prioritize violence problems, and coordinating efforts across community organizations, public agencies, schools, health providers, and other local stakeholders (Abt & Winship, 2016; McManus et al., 2020).

In response to post-pandemic increases in violence in their cities, two Ohio CVI organizations were awarded American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) funds in 2023 from the Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services (OCJS) to support community-based violence reduction initiatives: Community for New Direction (CND) in Columbus and the Urban League of Greater Southwestern Ohio (ULGSO) in Cincinnati. This report serves as a mixed-methods process and impact evaluation of these two community-based crime prevention programs. While their social, geographic, and operational settings are distinct, both approaches are designed to provide access to services for individuals in need, particularly youth in high-risk contexts, and provide a more holistic public safety approach by reducing formal, police-based contacts and providing alternative, pro-social and educational opportunities for young people.

Community for New Direction (CND)

The CND is a Columbus, Ohio-based nonprofit organization dedicated to violence prevention, youth development, and the treatment of substance use and mental health conditions. Since its founding in 1989, the CND has responded to the needs of inner-city, economically distressed neighborhoods, focusing on high-risk youth and young adults affected by poverty, substance use, and violence. The CND’s violence prevention and intervention model is rooted in evidence-based practices and a prevention-first philosophy. Program staff spend time in gang-controlled areas, build relationships and conduct outreach with youth involved in violence or at risk of involvement in the juvenile justice system, and focus on the development of pro-social, academic, and vocational skills. The CND’s key program components include outreach

and engagement, case management, a violence intervention team, wraparound services, and community partnerships.

Urban League of Greater Southwestern Ohio (ULGSO)

The ULGSO traces its origins to 1948 and continues to operate as a grassroots organization focused on empowering communities, seeking justice, and advancing opportunities. The ULGSO leveraged ARPA funding to expand its Community Partnering Center (CPC) and youth programs to enhance evidence-based violence reduction strategies and intensify efforts to address the root causes of violence, particularly through the work of Community Outreach Advocates and Community Engagement Specialists. The CPC builds community capacity to address crime, disorder, and quality of life issues by working collaboratively with residents, stakeholders, and the Cincinnati Police Department. Its approach emphasizes prevention, identifying and addressing conditions that lead to violence, garnering community support to create safer neighborhoods, and supporting individuals at increased risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of violence with educational, social, and developmental support.

RESEARCH METHODS

Our research team used a mixed-methods, three-pronged approach to understanding the violence prevention initiatives of CND and ULGSO. First, our **risk analysis** relies on official police data and Census data to describe relevant risk factors and the community context in which CND and ULGSO operate. Second, our **process evaluation** describes the implementation of the overall violence prevention initiatives in each setting, including planning and design, resource allocation, self-monitoring, and continuous improvement. Third, our **outcome evaluation** assessed how each setting aligned with the most promising evidence-based youth crime and delinquency prevention and intervention strategies.

FINDINGS

Community for New Direction (CND)

The risk analyses confirm that youth where the CND focused its efforts during the study period were at a disproportionately high rate of exposure to crime, particularly in South Linden, while North and South Linden are more socially stable than might be expected based on crime levels alone. These structural analyses suggest the greatest risk factors for youth in North and South Linden are delinquency rates and run-ins with law enforcement. In short, the CND focusing its efforts within the Linden community has the potential to make a considerable long-term social impact because these are among the communities most in need of conflict mediation, education, and goal management programs for youth.

The process and outcome evaluations show that the CND's strongest areas include individualized case management and goal setting, consistent documentation of services and outcomes, credible outreach, conflict mediation, youth development, and efforts to help youth

avoid involvement in the criminal justice system. The CND also demonstrated capacity for continuous improvement by modifying goals, intervention strategies, and service connections to better align with participant needs and organizational capacity.

Urban League of Greater Southwestern Ohio (ULGSO)

The ULGSO's evaluation findings show strong alignment with several core features of community-based antiviolenence work. The ULGSO focuses limited resources on the Cincinnati neighborhoods that account for a disproportionate share of the city's violence, while also remaining responsive to emerging problems. During the ARPA funding period, the ULGSO allocated resources through youth programming, outreach and engagement, summer employment, referrals, responses to violent incidents, SARA (Scanning Analysis, Response, Assessment)-based training, and community resource events.

The Government Square case study is the clearest example of this adaptive approach. Based on emerging concerns about youth violence and disorder at a major public transportation hub, ULGSO temporarily shifted personnel away from neighborhood-based work and concentrated outreach staff at Government Square. Between February and May 2024, staff engaged with more than 700 youth and referred more than 300 to youth programming or other resources, including food, clothing, housing, mental health, employment, and legal services. As the initiative progressed, staff adapted strategies, developed behavior norms, created referral pathways, trained other outreach personnel, and transitioned responsibilities to a broader collaborative outreach structure. Lessons learned from Government Square later informed efforts in Avondale, Winton Hills, and other neighborhoods.

SUMMARY OF CVI EVALUATIONS

Taken together, the findings demonstrate that both the CND and the ULGSO contribute important violence prevention capacity in their respective cities. The CND's work is especially strong in direct youth engagement, individualized goal management, conflict mediation, and efforts to provide alternatives to formal justice system involvement. The ULGSO's work is especially strong in building community capacity, coordinating across public and community partners, using the SARA framework, and responding flexibly to emerging violence and disorder problems.

Both evaluations also point to several common implementation challenges and mitigation strategies. The organizations had to balance prevention-focused programming with the need to respond to immediate crises, emerging conflicts, and changing neighborhood conditions. They also faced the recurring challenge of building and maintaining trust with youth and families while sustaining engagement after initial contact. Both organizations mitigated these challenges by relying on trusted outreach staff, tailoring services to individual circumstances, using data and community intelligence to guide deployment, connecting participants to partner organizations when needs could not be met directly, and adjusting goals, staffing, intervention strategies, and referral pathways as new problems emerged. Their experiences

suggest that effective CVI work depends not only on strong program models, but also on the ability to monitor implementation, adapt in real time, and maintain credible relationships with residents, public agencies, schools, law enforcement, and other community partners.

Across both sites, several lessons emerge: (1) CVI requires sustained funding, staff capacity, and strong partnerships; (2) trust-based relationships with youth and communities are central to implementation; (3) data and community knowledge must be used together to focus attention and resources; (4) law enforcement relationships must be carefully calibrated; and (5) programs need flexible structures that allow staff to respond to immediate crises while also supporting longer-term prevention goals. Overall, this evaluation suggests that community-based violence prevention strategies can provide a more holistic public safety response when they are grounded in local context, supported by durable partnerships, and paired with ongoing assessment of implementation and outcomes.

1.INTRODUCTION

Nationally, violent crime significantly increased in urban areas across the United States in the years following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 (Rosenfeld & Lopez, 2022). Many factors have been attributed to this increase in crime and violence, including the disruption caused by the pandemic response to the routine activities of social and institutional mechanisms that regulate behavior (Lopez & Rosenfeld, 2021). This increase was followed by an equally pronounced decline in violent crime beginning in 2024 in many major cities, that has continued to plummet to record-setting lows in homicides and violent crime (Lopez & Boxerman, 2026). The specific reasons for these declines are the subject of much political and scholarly debate, particularly related to the effectiveness of specific violence reduction strategies, such as community violence intervention (CVI) (CCJ, 2026; Greene, 2026; McDonald & Friedrich, 2026).

Approaches to Violence Reduction

Two primary types of violence reduction strategies exist: law enforcement and community-based (McManus et al., 2020). Police-led strategies often focus efforts on prolific offenders or geographic spaces where violence clusters. Among the most studied approaches are those based on hot spots policing and focused deterrence, with both demonstrating the ability to reduce crime, at least in the short term (Braga et al., 2014, 2018, 2026; Corsaro et al., 2023; Corsaro & Engel, 2015).

Community violence intervention (CVI) refers to a range of community-led strategies designed to reduce violence by addressing the individual, social, and environmental factors that contribute to it (McManus et al., 2020). CVI has evolved into an umbrella term encompassing a diverse range of approaches rooted largely in public health and community-based models, including violence interruption and street outreach, hospital-based violence intervention programs, group violence intervention strategies, cognitive behavioral interventions, mentoring initiatives, school-based programs, victim services, and place-based approaches designed to address environmental conditions associated with violence (Ziminski et al., 2025).

Although CVI strategies vary considerably across jurisdictions, many share several common features, including focusing resources on the small number of individuals and locations at greatest risk, employing trusted community members or "credible messengers" to engage participants, using data and community knowledge to identify and prioritize violence problems, and coordinating efforts across community organizations, public agencies, schools, health providers, and other local stakeholders (Abt & Winship, 2016; McManus et al., 2020). Common activities include violence interruption, conflict mediation, intensive outreach, mentoring, and connecting participants with prosocial opportunities and support services intended to provide alternatives to violence involvement and reduce their risk factors for justice system involvement (Maguire et al., 2025).

Community-based violence prevention efforts are often designed to complement traditional public safety responses by providing non-enforcement mechanisms for addressing conflict, victimization risk, and the underlying conditions associated with violence. Some organizations maintain collaborative relationships with police and other criminal justice agencies, while others intentionally operate completely independent from law enforcement in order to build trust and credibility among community members that may be distrustful of the police (Ziminski et al., 2025; Maguire et al., 2025).

The empirical evidence regarding CVI is mixed but promising, and the strength of the evidence varies across specific models and interventions. Systematic reviews suggest that community-led violence prevention efforts can reduce violence when implemented with strong stakeholder collaboration, high-quality implementation, sustained engagement with individuals at greatest risk, and sufficient organizational capacity (McManus et al., 2020; Abt & Winship, 2016). Recent evidence on street outreach and violence interruption programs indicates that these approaches are associated with modest but statistically significant reductions in violent crime and nonfatal shootings, although findings remain mixed across jurisdictions and appear highly dependent on implementation quality and organizational capacity (Maguire et al., 2025). More broadly, the literature suggests that successful violence reduction initiatives share several common elements, including a focus on high-risk people and places, strong community partnerships, data-informed decision making, clearly articulated theories of change, and ongoing assessment of program implementation and outcomes (Abt & Winship, 2016; McManus et al., 2020).

Report Overview

In the post-pandemic period, rising violence was a major concern for law enforcement agencies and communities across the country. In response to increases in violence in their cities, two local community violence intervention organizations were awarded American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) funds in 2023 from the Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services (OCJS) to support community-based violence reduction initiatives: Community for New Direction (CND) and Urban League of Greater Southwestern Ohio (ULGSO). This report serves as a mixed-methods process and impact evaluation of these two community-based crime prevention programs. While both social, geographic, and ultimately operational settings are distinct and unique, each of these intervention programs has similar orientations toward crime prevention, community enhancement, and social engagement. More specifically, both approaches are designed to improve community trust, provide access to services for individuals in need (particularly youth in high-risk contexts), and provide a more holistic public safety approach by reducing formal, police-based contacts, and providing alternative, pro-social and educational opportunities for young people.

This research aims to document the strengths and challenges associated with implementing CVI programs in Columbus and Cincinnati and assess the initiatives' overall impact. Specifically, we examine the impact of the violence prevention programs implemented by

ULGSO in Cincinnati and CND in Columbus by (1) systematically examining and describing the crime prevention processes implemented, (2) assessing the impact of these initiatives on targeted violence, and (3) developing a series of lessons learned and identifying best practices for dissemination to other jurisdictions in the State of Ohio, and beyond, that are engaging in CVI strategies.

In Section 2, we describe our data sources and study methodology for the process and outcome evaluations. In Sections 3 (CND) and 4 (ULGSO), we begin with a program description, an assessment of community-level risk factors associated with youth crime and delinquency as context for each organization's operating environment, and then present the findings from the process and outcome evaluations. In Section 4, we also present the findings of a place- and time-specific case study (Government Square), which was a multifaceted citywide intervention (that included ULGSO workers as well as many other participants in the City of Cincinnati) to impact crime and wayward behavior of youth in a public transportation hub. Finally, we conclude this report with a synthesis of the successes, challenges, and mitigation strategies from both evaluations and their relationship to the evidence-based scholarly literature.

2.DATA & METHODOLOGY

Our research team used a mixed-methods, three-pronged approach to understanding the violence prevention initiatives of CND and ULGSO. Specifically, this includes:

- 1) *Risk analysis* – this provides a description of the relevant risk factors and community context in which CND and ULGSO operate.
- 2) *Process evaluation* – this describes the implementation of the overall violence prevention initiatives in each setting, including problem identification, the programs’ planning and design, resource allocation, and feedback used in each setting.
- 3) *Outcome evaluation* – this assesses how each setting aligns with the most promising evidence-based youth crime and delinquency prevention and intervention strategies.

To implement this mixed-methods approach, we rely on multiple data sources, which are described in Table 2.1.¹ The primary period of interest for these data sources is Sept 2023 to Dec 2024 when the funding support was in place. However, particularly for the official police data, we broaden the time period examined to include 2022 – 2025 for the purpose of balancing the ‘center’ of this evaluation period into broader trends and counts.

Crime and arrest counts are operationalized in monthly frequencies (i.e., the number of criminal offense reports and arrests per month over this study period). Criminal offenses are partitioned into Part I (more serious offenses including burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and homicide) and Part II offenses (less serious offenses including but not limited to breaking and entering, stalking, simple assaults, fraud, illegally discharged firearms, fraud, forgery, and embezzlement).

¹ The OSU Institutional Review Board responsible for human subjects’ research reviewed and approved this research project.

Table 2.1 Data Sources

Data Source	Description
Organizational records	• Program applications; programmatic monitoring reports; internal program reports; de-identified case management files; and quarterly reports submitted to OCJS as part of the ARPA funding period
Semi-structured interviews and focus groups with CVI staff	• Conducted with six participants in March 2026 • Loosely followed a pre-established discussion protocol designed to elicit information related to specific topics (Krueger & Casey, 2015) • Discussion topics: program overview, daily work, resource allocation, staffing, role of partners, successes, challenges, lessons learned • Documented via notetaking rather than recordings to encourage participants' candor
Official police data provided by Columbus Div of Police & Cincinnati Police Dept	• Provided for period from 1/1/21 to 12/31/25² • Criminal offenses as reported by the PDs for the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) • Arrest reports completed by officers for each PD
Census Data	• Accessed publicly available data from 2020 ACS 5-year estimates for each city at the census tract level and aggregated to neighborhood level • Measures of economic and social strain, including % renter occupied housing, % in poverty, % unemployed, and % female headed households with children < 18

Risk Analysis

Given that both the ULGSO and the CND focus on youth crime and delinquency prevention and intervention, the risk analysis relies on official police data and Census data to describe some of the relevant risk factors and community context in which these organizations operate and to which youth in specific Columbus and Cincinnati neighborhoods are exposed. The scholarly literature demonstrates that there is no single risk factor that can predict who is likely (or not likely) to engage in delinquent behavior (Mmari et al., 2010); rather, the effect is cumulative: the more risk factors present in a youth's life, the greater the probability of the youth committing delinquent acts (Reingle et al., 2011). The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2015) classified risk factors for delinquency into five domains, including individual, peer, family, school, and community. Unfortunately, only community

² For the Columbus and Cincinnati Risk Analyses we were able to extend the data through 1/1/2021 for crime data. For all other data, the starting period of analysis was 1/1/2022 for data reliability and validity enhancement.

risk factors (social disadvantage measures, crime, etc.) are readily available for our consideration. These risks focus on criminal offending, criminal victimization, police use of arrests (involving juveniles), which can have lasting unintended consequences (Wiley et al., 2013), and relevant census measures to obtain a profile of the structural conditions that may correlate with higher crime and arrest levels.

Process Evaluation

The process evaluation for each site is based on organizational reports and data, qualitative interviews, and quarterly reports submitted to the OCJS as part of the ARPA funding period. Drawing upon Zheng et al. (2013), the process evaluation is organized around four key phases, which are documented for each CVI organization:

- Planning and design: set goals, determine strategies, develop implementation framework
- Resource allocation: identify priorities (geographic locations, times, services, staff, participants), promote efficiency, seek additional resources as needed
- Self-monitoring: identify mitigation strategies as challenges arise, seek feedback, measure performance, compare goals with performance
- Continuous improvement: based on self-monitoring, identify areas to sustain, adapt, discard.

Ultimately, the goal was to be able to provide details regarding how the ULGSO and CND developed, implemented, evaluated, and adapted CVI strategies.

Outcome Evaluation

In terms of assessing key components of each of these programs, we draw upon evidence-based practices to highlight how each of these CVI programs and its crime prevention interventions aligned with the most salient features of antiviolenence strategies. More specifically, in 2022, the Urban Institute published *A Research-Based Practice Guide to Reduce Youth Gun and Gang/Group Violence*, based upon systematic reviews of some of the most effective youth violence prevention strategies³ and the subsequent successful lessons learned across various crime prevention models (Jannetta et al., 2022). Based upon this review, the report highlighted two overarching components of successful violence prevention and intervention programs: 1) Building an Antiviolenence Infrastructure, and 2) Building Effective Programs. These two components and the various Practice Areas within them are displayed in Table 2.2 below.

³ The Urban Institute's Guide was based on reviews of the following diverse and widely regarded programs: 1) the Focused Deterrence Model; 2) the Public Health Model, and 3) the Comprehensive Gang Model.

Table 2.2: Urban Institute’s Practical Guide to Reduce Youth Violence

Overarching Components	Practice Areas
<i>Building Antiviolence Infrastructure</i>	• Formalize the Government’s Role in Antiviolence Work • Fund and Enhance the Capacity of a Robust Community-Based Antiviolence Strategy • Engage the Community to Establish and Maintain Peace • Calibrate the Relationship between Law Enforcement and Community Violence Interventions • Collect and Share Data to Refine Practices and Assess Effectiveness
<i>Building Effective Programs</i>	• Assess the Problem to Focus Attention and Resources • Build Positive Relationships with and Support Young People at High Risk of Gun and Gang/Group Violence • Interrupt and Mediate Conflicts • Use Suppression and Enforcement Precisely and Sparingly

(Jannetta et al., 2022)

The outcome evaluation methodology employed by our research team is based upon a systematic review of notes, quarterly reports, case management files, and qualitative interviews where we focus on these two broad components and nine Practice Areas. For each evaluated CVI program, the research team based its assessment (analogous to a measure of dosage) using the following scale:

O = Presumed or explicit absence;

√ = Presumed or standard presence;

√+ = Explicit or exceptional presence.

As Table 2.3 demonstrates, the scale value will be provided with a rationale for the selection of the value given for each of the nine Practice Areas of successful youth violence prevention programs based upon the Urban Institute’s 2022 systematic review (Jannetta et al., 2022).

Table 2.3: Description of Rating Scale for Outcome Evaluation

Scale	0	√	√+
<i>Definition</i>	Absence Presumed and/or Intentional	Presumed and/or Standard Presence	Explicit and/or Exceptional Presence
<i>Design Rule</i>	Clear evidence that this component, for political, social, or economic purposes, was not a focal point of the project team	Suggestive evidence that this component was intended as part of the partnership or work	Clear, documented and detailed evidence that this presence was a focal point of the program (both intent as well as a mechanism to achieve its intent).
<i>Example</i>	A project member stated something akin to, “we tried to maintain distance” or “we did not want to showcase any kind of partnership to remain credible with our personnel, community groups, or individuals’ served.”	Case management notes state something like “information was shared across team members to enhance understand and feedback opportunities.”	The goal was to engage the community, and in-depth interviews showed that personnel: 1) wanted community feedback, and 2) provided a forum to obtain feedback from community members that was taken into account in the decision-making process.

3.COMMUNITY FOR NEW DIRECTION

The Community for New Direction (CND) is a Columbus (Franklin County), Ohio-based nonprofit organization dedicated to violence prevention, youth development, and the treatment of substance use and mental health conditions. In this section, we begin with a program description, an assessment of community-level risk factors associated with youth crime and delinquency as context for the CND’s operating environment in Columbus and then present the findings from the process and outcome evaluations. Throughout the section, we rely on the multiple data sources described in Section 2.

Program Description

Since its founding in 1989, the CND has responded to the needs of inner-city, economically distressed neighborhoods, focusing on high-risk youth and young adults affected by poverty, substance use, and violence, particularly urban Black and Hispanic youth. The CND’s violence prevention and intervention model is rooted in evidence-based practices and a prevention-first philosophy. Program staff spend time in gang-controlled areas, build relationships and conduct outreach with youth involved in violence or at risk of involvement in the juvenile justice system, and focus on the development of pro-social, academic, and vocational skills.

The CND's key program components include outreach and engagement, case management, a violence intervention team, wraparound services, and community partnerships. A brief description of each is provided below:

- **Outreach and Engagement:** CND staff work in schools and neighborhoods, receiving referrals from parents, probation officers, school principals, security personnel, guidance counselors, coaches, and city and state agencies including the Dept of Youth Correctional Services, and probation and parole. Outreach is targeted to youth identified as leaders or those at risk of retaliatory violence. One such example includes “Temperature Check Tuesdays” where CND violence intervention staff proactively engage with youth showing signs of conflict.
- **Case Management:** Each officially enrolled youth develops two personal goals, with progress tracked through case notes and regular interactions. Part of this goal-setting and monitoring process includes completing the [Search Institute's 40 Developmental Assets Checklist](#), which is designed to facilitate discussion with the youth about areas in which they have strong support toward healthy development as well as areas that they may need further assistance. This checklist focuses on the following internal and external assets: Support, empowerment, boundaries and expectations, constructive use of time, commitment to learning, positive values, social competencies, and positive identity. Staff provide guidance individually and in groups, address conflicts through crisis intervention and verbal de-escalation, and facilitate learning pro-social, academic, and vocational skills.
- **Violence Intervention Team:** The team includes a director, case manager, and intervention specialists, many of whom have lived experience in the communities they serve. Staff recruitment prioritizes credible messengers who can relate to and earn the trust of youth participants.
- **Wraparound Services:** The CND works to connect youth to positive opportunities and offers workforce development, employment readiness, substance abuse resources, tattoo removal, and other supports to help youth and families achieve stability and growth.
- **Community Partnerships:** The CND collaborates with the Mayor's Office as part of the Office of Violence Prevention, the Columbus Health Department, Parks & Recreation, schools, law enforcement, and other social service agencies to maximize impact and coordinate referrals.

RISK ANALYSIS


The CND maintains a county-wide footprint, going where they are needed as resources allow. However, CND officials, as part of their data-driven approaches, placed considerable emphasis on higher-risk geographic contexts in Columbus to have a more immediate and pronounced impact. Focus group interviews with CND staff indicated that there was a higher concentration of targeted services in the Linden community in Columbus, due to higher rates of crime and more limited parental involvement in these areas. This section examines community-level risk factors related to youth crime and delinquency to contextualize the CND's operating environment in Columbus.

In terms of historical context, the Linden community was originally developed in 1908 before being annexed by the City of Columbus in 1921 (Landers, 2021). While originally an emerging community, Linden suffered economic declines and racial tensions beginning in the 1960s and persisting for decades of disadvantage and distress (Gillis, 2025). Considerable resources have been integrated into the Linden community recently, consistent with the “[OneLinden Plan](#)” that was developed in 2018 with an emphasis on real estate, employment, and educational development. The broader Linden community in Columbus is partitioned across both northern and southern boundaries. The Columbus Division of Police (CDP) organizes data by 41 geographic areas, roughly representing different Columbus communities, including North Linden and South Linden.

The North and South Linden communities are variant in terms of their risk of crime, disorder, and economic distress. CDP crime data from 2021 through 2025 shows that South Linden has one of the highest overall crime rates in the City of Columbus (roughly 13,762 offenses per 10,000 residents), which ranks 5th out of 41 Columbus neighborhoods. North Linden has an overall crime rate of roughly 5,158 per 10,000 residents, which ranks 16th out of 41 Columbus neighborhoods, and is more in-line with the average crime rate as most of the city, which has an average overall crime rate of 5,893 total offenses per 10,000 residents (see Figure 3.1).

The violent crime rate distributions mirror the overall crime rate distributions. More specifically, North Linden's violent crime rate is near the middle of the City of Columbus with roughly 560 violent offenses per 10,000 residents (ranking it 14th out of 41 communities). The overall average violent crime rate in Columbus across 41 communities is just over 611 violent offenses per 10,000 residents. South Linden ranks 4th out of 41 communities from 2021 to 2025 in its violent crime rate at over 1,586 violent crimes per 10,000 residents (over double the city and that of North Linden).

Figure 3.1: Overall and Violent Crime Rates



Beyond crime, which is certainly a robust community-level risk factor, we also gauged these communities and their distribution of traditional sociological measures of economic and social strain, including percent renter occupied, percent in poverty, percent unemployed, and female headed households with children under 18 years old. For poverty, South Linden ranks 23rd while North Linden ranks 38th (suggesting South Linden is within the middle of the citywide distribution on poverty, while North Linden does not rank considerably high within Columbus in terms of poverty). For female headed households, South Linden ranks 16th (meaning it has a higher-than-normal rate of female headed households) while North Linden ranks 35th (indicating that North Linden does not have a high level of female headed households). Percent renter occupied: South Linden 40th; North Linden 23rd. Interestingly, neither community is high on unemployment (South Linden ranks 32nd while North Linden ranks 33rd).

In sum, the risk analyses confirm that youth, where the CND are focusing their efforts are at a disproportionately high rate of exposure to crime, but less so for social structural strains and constraints. Thus, socially, North and South Linden are at or are considerably higher than much of Columbus in terms of social stability, residential long-term stability, employment and poverty levels. In many ways both North and South Linden are moderately socially stable, though plagued, at least in the case of South Linden, with higher levels of crime and violence. These structural analyses suggest the greatest risk factors for youth in North and South Linden are delinquency rates and run-ins with law enforcement. In short, the CND focusing their efforts within the Linden community has the potential to make a considerable long-term social impact since these are among the most in-need of conflict mediation, education, and goal management programs for youth.

PROCESS EVALUATION

The purpose of the process analysis is to provide an analytical description of the various programs and processes used by the CND that center on the goal of risk reduction for youth in high-risk contexts. We achieve this process analysis by using two primary data sources: 1) programming file reviews (including internal/external reports, de-identified case management files, and memos); and 2) qualitative interviews with project personnel.

Planning and Design

The CND's goal setting, strategy identification, and development of an implementation framework preceded the current study period but the capacity of their staff to reach these goals was enhanced by the ARPA funding. Since its inception, the CND has focused on two primary goals: reducing youth violence and helping youth to stay out of the criminal justice system. The main strategies used to reach these goals include: youth outreach and engagement, youth development through individual and group mentoring and the introduction to prosocial opportunities (leadership training, educational engagement, employment assistance), and conflict mediation or resolution. The CND's framework for implementing these youth violence prevention and intervention strategies is multifaceted and includes work in Columbus schools and summer programs, the youth correctional system, and through community partnerships.

Resource Allocation

As noted in the program description, the CND operates throughout Franklin County, adjusting their programming to go where they are needed as resources permit. They necessarily focus their efforts on the locations and individuals that they perceive to be at the greatest risk to maximize their impact. The CND allocates resources based on different risk levels. For lower risk interventions, staff and personnel engage in building relationships inside of the school by attempting to bring students together that had conflict and attempt to work through alternative actions and outcomes of choice that are prosocial and reinforcing (but also satisfying to the aggrieved parties). Given that youth outside of schools on weekends are at greater risk of antisocial behavior in strained economic and social contexts (as evident by the risk analysis), to address *medium level risk levels*, staff and CND personnel go to neighborhood convenings to provide youth with encouraging behaviors (e.g., basketball games, social meetings, etc.). The *highest risk* social dimensions for youth involve group and gang violent feuds. For specific violent events, staff intervene in ongoing conflicts to reduce retaliation within new incidents (see Table 3.1 for specific monthly counts). The CND also maintains official criminal justice capacity with the Franklin County Court – Juvenile Division as an alternative support program for youth assigned.

Table 3.1 below includes monthly summary statistics compiled from CND monthly progress reports. Some measures (e.g., violence intervention participants) are a running/cumulative total while others are a unique monthly total (e.g., # of schools which partner with and have

CND staff attend and lead group discussions with students, or summer-specific months where youth receive employment opportunities/work).

In any given month during this period, the CND had, on average, between 5-7 personnel meeting with youth who were referred to the CND for services (self-referrals or secondary source referrals) to develop mediation sessions (for youth in conflict – often at various schools during lunch period). School-referred youth are offered the opportunity to come together with other students with whom prior conflict emerged (often at a lunch at a school which is partnered with the CND), and work through problem solving and develop solutions/resolutions to the conflict. CND staff consistently noted that they intervened in dozens of on-going conflicts per month (specific details for interventions are confidential, but notes illustrate a consistent pattern of recognition of an ongoing feud, an attempt to understand the core root of the problem, and a focus on reconciliation before retaliation).

During the summer months (June-August), the CND did not operate with school partners on a weekly basis in their conflict mediation (since schools were out of session for much of this period). However, CND staff shifted their efforts in the summer by supporting youth in their youth employment program, where CND staff provide daily mentorship and hire local youth in various capacities. Education, training, development, employment, and financial compensation are the mechanisms to foster growth in strained communities.

This demonstrates a steady commitment and, at times a linear growth (e.g., youth where services were provided) in all components of their crime prevention programs over time.

Table 3.1: Cumulative Services Provided by CND Personnel for Violence Intervention Outreach (Mar – Dec 2024)

	3/24	4/24	5/24	6/24	7/24	8/24	9/24	10/24	11/24	12/24
# Violence Intervention Participants**	91	106	124	132	171	174	174	174	174	179
# of Schools where CND has Process Groups Involved	4	4	4	N/A	N/A	N/A	4	5	5	4
Summer Youth Employment	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	23	23	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
# of Clients on Probation (FC-JD)	13	22	26	25	29	32	32	32	32	--
# of Potentials	6	7	10	7	1	7	5	8	8	6
# of De-Escalations by CND Staff	9	3	4	3	1	3	2	2	2	--

** = Cumulative Total Services Provided; All others period-specific

N/A = Time Period Where Program Is Inoperable (Summer Youth Programs are summer specific; School programs do not operate in the summer)

-- Missing field

Self-Monitoring

Perhaps the most illustrative example of the CND's engagement in self-monitoring is through its individualized case management and goal setting processes. When CND interventionists work with youth in a one-on-one capacity, they help the youth participants complete an intake process and develop an Individual Service Plans (ISP) that identifies specific goals, action steps, and intervention supports. The CND case manager has the individual youth specifically list out their immediate goals (e.g., for the next three months), and document what specific steps are necessary to obtain these goals. The ISPs also require the youth to list specific tasks they want their interventionist (CND personnel member) to assist with (e.g., check-ins, provide options, review work submitted, etc.). In this sense, the ISP is not a passive process but an active engagement process for both the youth and the interventionist.

CND staff document participant services and outcomes through case management activities, tracking referrals, service provision, educational engagement, employment placements, arrests, and participant interactions. In their forthcoming meetings, the interventionist provides the youth with their prior goal list to cross-reference work done vs. work intended. The CND uses an evaluative feedback session with youth to ensure expectations are met by *everyone* involved. Through this ongoing engagement, staff routinely assess barriers that could limit participant success (e.g., financial constraints, family challenges, transportation barriers). Based on this feedback, interventionists respond by helping youth problem-solve or modify plans when barriers emerge, and connecting participants to partner organizations when needed services cannot be provided directly. This process demonstrates self-monitoring because it includes documenting participant progress, tracking service delivery, identifying barriers to success, and adjusting individual intervention plans.

Staff also describe using "Temperature Check Tuesday" sessions to maintain regular contact with youth, identify emerging tensions and conflicts, and determine whether additional intervention is necessary. Program staff also rely on school personnel, recreation center staff, courts, corrections agencies, and community partners to identify potential conflicts and youth in need of services.

Continuous Improvement

The CND's approach to continuous improvement emphasized ongoing refinement with staff routinely modifying goals, intervention strategies, and service connections to better align with participant needs and organizational capacity. Goals were intentionally designed to be realistic and achievable, then reassessed regularly to determine whether they should be advanced, modified, or replaced. Staff emphasized tailoring interventions to individual circumstances rather than relying on standardized service plans.

Other documentation from the CND demonstrates an organizational history of adapting practices as needed. For example, although the program continues to prioritize hiring "credible messengers" with lived experience, leaders reported moving away from recruiting former gang members (prior to the current funding period) after determining that historical group affiliations could sometimes undermine engagement efforts or contribute to existing tensions.

Another example mentioned in the interviews illustrates ways that the CND sometimes expands their programming based on emerging or observed needs. Specifically, interviewees noted that students were carrying guns to and from school to ensure they could arrive there safely. In response, the CND partnered with community agencies and positive male role models to implement a Safe Passage program to create safe routes for students without the need for firearms.

OUTCOME EVALUATION

In this section we document and describe the nine key pillars of successful youth violence intervention programs as documented by the Urban Institute's (2022) Systematic Review of Youth Violence Prevention programs. After describing each pillar, we assess how CND falls on the following scale: the following scale:

O = Presumed or explicit absence

√ = Presumed or standard presence

√+ = Explicit or exceptional presence

1. Formalize Government's Role in Coordinating Antiviolence Work

"Local government has an important role to play in funding, coordinating, and supporting antiviolence work, although much of that work may be carried out by non-governmental

organizations. Robust collaborative work done to reduce youth gun violence related to groups and gangs requires a varied toolkit that includes enforcement, intervention, prevention, and community engagement, and government is best positioned to situate each of these within an overall strategy” (Jannetta et al., 2022, p. 11)

CND Scale Value: √

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: The CND’s youth violence prevention is clearly linked with local government organizations and individuals as part of their scope of services. The CND regularly serves and supports youth referred through the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas – Juvenile Division, serving roughly 20-30 juveniles per month (as noted in Table 3.1 above). In addition, CND personnel work with 4-5 schools each month to provide services there (often during lunch periods) to engage in conflict mediation and resolution across student groups from at-risk contexts. Furthermore, they are an official resource listed within the Columbus Mayor’s Office of Violence Prevention.

2. Fund and Enhance the Capacity of a Robust Community-Based Antiviolence Strategy

“Executing a robust community-based antiviolence strategy requires investing in the people and organizations that do antiviolence work, just as government at all levels has invested in traditional justice agencies and professionals. This investment starts with adequate funding and includes building broad and sustained antiviolence partnerships and investing in the antiviolence workforce and community violence interventions” (Jannetta et al., 2022, p. 17).

CND Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: In its 2024 Annual Report, the CND reported receiving funds from diverse revenue sources, including county, city, and federal funds, as well as private donations and program-generated revenue (CND, 2025). Furthermore, they have extensive partnerships within the county, city, and state. Finally, CND staff indicated feeling supported within the organization and noted they are encouraged to participate in professional development opportunities to enhance their work. Each of these elements has contributed to the CND’s ability to maintain and build capacity across multiple dimensions of community-based antiviolence work.

3. Engage the Community to Establish and Maintain Peace

“The community is an essential partner and can provide powerful resources for reducing violence and connecting with the community to make and keep the peace. Proactive peacemaking is an important component of violence reduction models; for instance, it could constitute the community mobilization component of the Comprehensive Gang Model or the norms and narratives work of the public health or focused deterrence models. Communities are complex and varied systems, and the forms that community engagement in antiviolence strategies can take are also varied. For community-based antiviolence strategies to be as

successful as possible, they should happen in tandem with other intervention strategies” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 26).

CND Scale Value: √

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: Neighborhood violence intervention quarterly reports by CND clearly illustrate that key project personnel “diffused potentially violent incidents” through conflict mediation in the Linden neighborhoods (as well as near Eastside), which were high risk locations for violent crime to youth (as noted in the Risk Analysis section). On average, the number of potentially diffused violent incidents reported by officials ranged from 3-4 to 6-7 per month, depending on the neighborhood (Linden had the highest) and the period of reporting. While it is certainly likely that CND officials worked in tandem with other community groups (beyond conflict resolution) the extent to which potential partners from the community were engaged was not as evident as the work that was done by CND officials (which was clearly well documented).

4. Calibrate the Relationship between Law Enforcement and Community Violence Interventions

“In communities experiencing high levels of gun violence, there is a deep distrust of the police rooted in the history of racial disparities in enforcement and the control of communities of color, and there are large disparities in enforcement and use of force against youth of color. This was the area that people we interviewed in our scan of practices consistently named as a profound challenge to effective work to reduce youth gun and gang violence” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 30).

CND Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: CND staff acknowledged the relationship between their organization and law enforcement can be complex. They described maintaining a healthy working relationship, particularly at common community events. They also noted that direct communication typically goes through organizational leadership rather than violence intervention staff because of the noted challenges with the lack of youth trust in law enforcement officials. CND staff work diligently to provide youth opportunities to avoid involvement in the criminal justice system. However, they also successfully work directly with youth who are already in the system through their referrals from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

5. Collect and Share Data to Refine Practices and Assess Effectiveness

“It is critical that antiviolenence intervention stakeholders collect and report data to ensure antiviolenence work is done well, to correct course when needed, and to build and sustain efforts over the long term. But this requires investing in data and analysis capacity and committing to ensuring the data are actually put to use” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 34).

CND Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: The CND collects information regarding enrolled clients and documents all staff interactions with them. As noted in the process assessment, the CND uses multiple assessment tools to not only gauge risks and goals, but also requires the youth who receive services to outline their specific tasks, the expectations the youth have of the CND staff and personnel to achieve their goals, and a systematic review of steps that were attained (or not attained) in the subsequent meetings. The CND also uses data to guide their conflict resolutions (i.e., noting which feuds or potential conflicts are ongoing) to develop mediation strategies.

6. Assess the Problem to Focus Attention and Resources

“Research on the three primary program models indicates the importance of devoting time to up-front analysis and tailoring interventions to local conditions in supporting implementation success, and our scan of practices substantiated the value of this practice, suggesting that ongoing routine assessment is critical for effective responses and continuous improvement” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 40).

CND Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: The CND focus of attention ranges across geographies (i.e., Linden and Eastside in particular), contexts (schools), seasons (school year vs. summer youth activities and employment), and at different periods of conflict and risk (i.e., when feuds between groups are emergent). The CND does not have a singular solution it attempts to mold to fit its variety of risks and problems it faces but rather tailors the response to the risk and need. For example, when the CND became aware of students carrying guns to and from school to ensure they could arrive safely, the CND implemented Safe Passage programs to create safe routes for students by partnering with community agencies and positive male role models.

7. Build Positive Relationships with and Support Young People at High Risk of Gun and Gang/Group Violence

“The fact that it is a relatively small number of identifiable people who are at the highest risk of committing or falling victim to youth gun and group violence creates an opportunity to engage in focused proactive work to prevent violence through direct engagement that builds trusting relationships with youth at high risk. This kind of relational work is a core component of every approach to addressing youth gun and group violence, except for standalone suppression” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 46).

CND Scale Value: √

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: Building positive relationships with high-risk youth is a core component of CND's intervention model and appears to be one of the organization's primary strengths. The CND engages youth through individualized outreach, one-on-one goal

setting, family engagement, conflict mediation, school-based programming, and ongoing support services designed to build trust and maintain relationships over time. Staff emphasized meeting youth where they are, using empathetic communication, involving parents and other supportive adults when possible, and establishing realistic goals that are regularly reviewed and adjusted. Referrals originate from multiple community sources, including schools, courts, recreation centers, correctional facilities, and community organizations, allowing the program to engage youth at various points of risk. The CND also prioritizes hiring credible messengers with relevant lived experience and strong relationship-building skills. While the program clearly excels at developing positive relationships with high-risk youth, there is less evidence that it employs highly formalized methods to systematically identify and prioritize the small number of individuals at greatest risk of gun and group violence, preventing the assignment of the highest rating.

8. Interrupt and Mediate Conflicts

“Intervening in active conflicts is a core part of many different initiatives to address youth gun and group violence because such a large portion of gun violence is based on intergroup dynamics and retaliatory cycles. Conflict interruption has two aspects: acute response to shootings to prevent further spread of violence from an incident that has already occurred, and proactive work to mediate emergent or ongoing intergroup conflicts” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 58).

CND Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: As noted in multiple areas in this report, CND clearly tracks the number of “deescalations” it has hosted (seen in Table 3.1) as well as the number of juveniles served in violence prevention programs.

9. Use Suppression and Enforcement Precisely and Sparingly

“The roles of suppression and enforcement have to be carefully defined and bounded in a successful and sustainable youth violence reduction effort” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 62).

CND Scale Value: √

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: The intent to reduce formal criminal justice responses to conflicts, feuds, and to prevent violence is a clear goal of the CND across each of its programs related to youth violence prevention. The extent to which the youth violence interventions are explicitly (rather than implicitly) designed to reduce arrest and suppression in the immediate term is not overtly defined.

4. URBAN LEAGUE OF GREATER SOUTHWESTERN OHIO (ULGSO)

The Urban League of Greater Southwestern Ohio (ULGSO) in Cincinnati (Hamilton County) traces its origins back to 1948, when its founders attempted to address the needs of predominantly Black and underserved communities in the Cincinnati and Dayton (Ohio) metropolitan areas. Founded, and still operating, as a grassroots organization, the ULGSO offers a diverse array of programs to maintain its focus on empowering communities, seeking justice, and advancing opportunities. The ULGSO offers a wide variety of programs (e.g., leadership, urban technology collective, business and entrepreneurship, financial empowerment, social justice, and recruitment and retention programs), but the focus of our evaluation is on the crime prevention programming that is housed within the Community Partnering Center and its youth programs portfolio.

In this section, we begin with a program description, followed by an assessment of community-level risk factors associated with youth crime and delinquency as context for ULGSO's operating environment in Cincinnati. We then present the findings from the process and outcome evaluations. This section also includes a case study examining the role of ULGSO community violence intervention professionals in a collaborative youth violence intervention at Government Square in Cincinnati. Throughout the section, we rely on the multiple data sources described in Section 2.

Program Description

The ULGSO leveraged American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) funding to expand its Community Partnering Center (CPC) and its Youth Programs sections to enhance evidence-based violence reduction strategies and intensify efforts to address the root causes of violence, in particular the work of Community Outreach Advocates and Community Engagement Specialists. The CPC builds community capacity to address crime, disorder, and quality of life issues by working collaboratively with residents, stakeholders, and the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD). The Center's approach emphasizes prevention, identifying and addressing conditions that lead to violence, garnering community support to create a safer neighborhood, and supporting individuals at increased risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of violence with educational, social, and developmental support.

The CPC seeks to empower communities through strategic partnerships, comprehensive programming, and innovative solutions. The ULGSO's CPC programs include:

- **Community Engagement and Outreach:** The ULGSO team actively engages with residents, hosting forums, workshops, and events to address pressing issues and gather input on community needs.

- **Youth Development:** ULGSO staff work to develop youth programs which are designed to nurture the next generation of leaders. From educational support and mentorship to recreational activities and leadership training through meetings, forums, and seminars with hands-on activities.
- **Crime Prevention and Safety:** The ULGSO prides itself in partnering with local law enforcement and community organizations. The team implements strategies to reduce crime and enhance safety. The ULGSO's initiatives include neighborhood watch programs, safety workshops, and advocacy for fair policing practices.

The ULGSO's youth programming is grounded in the belief that violence prevention requires more than simply responding to conflict. Rather, staff emphasize expanding opportunities, strengthening educational engagement, and fostering positive connections between youth and their communities. One of the specific CPC programs to note is the Urban Champions Youth Program, which seeks to equip 14 to 19-year-olds with career awareness, exposure, and development. It aims to bridge employers and youth employees through networks of capacity and outreach. It also includes an annual citywide Youth Summit. In 2024, for example, the Youth Summit included 300 attendees at its full-day, youth-led event. This event gives teens a platform to share their voice on topics like youth violence, police brutality, advocacy, and leadership. Participants can also explore career options, community service needs, civic engagement, and personal strength development. Across multiple initiatives, the ULGSO aims to equip young people with the skills, resources, and support networks needed to achieve long-term success while promoting leadership, resilience, and positive social development. Based on this approach, program activities frequently combined mentoring, educational support, career exploration, community engagement, and relationship-building to address both immediate risks and longer-term developmental needs.

RISK ANALYSIS


The ULGSO has an expansive footprint but necessarily focuses its limited resources and programming on the top 10 neighborhoods in Cincinnati that account for a disproportionate share of the city's violence. This section examines community-level risk factors related to youth crime and delinquency to contextualize the ULGSO's operating environment in Cincinnati.

We obtained criminal incident and arrest data from the CPD ranging from Jan 1, 2021 through Dec 31, 2025. During this 5-year period, there were 124,935 crimes reported across the City of Cincinnati (where one incident was counted as a singular crime).⁴ This equates to roughly

⁴ The CPD reports crime data to the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which deviates from the older Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) system in one important way: NIBRS does not automatically cull data to the 'most serious offense but rather can include multiple offenses within the same incident for contextual analysis (e.g., in the UCR system, a home break-in, burglary which resulted in a murder would have only been counted as a murder (hierarchy), while the NIBRS data reports it as both a property offense (breaking and entering) and a violent offense (murder). To reduce 'redundancy' and the opportunity for double counting singular incidents

25,000 criminal incidents reported to the CPD per year. Importantly, the CPD collects information about whether either the victim(s) or suspected offender(s) in the incidents is a juvenile (under 18 years old). For overall criminal incidents between 2021 and 2025, juvenile-related incidents (as either victims or suspects) comprised roughly 9.0% of all crime (11,176 / 124,935). However, as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, juveniles are at differential risks of crime depending on 1) the types of offenses, and/or 2) the geographic location of the incidents. For violent offenses, juveniles' risk of involvement is considerably higher than in the average distribution of all offenses (nearly 1 out of every five violent incidents). Rape involves a juvenile in 24.3% of incidents; robberies involve juveniles in 23.2% of incidents; homicides involve juveniles in 20.3% of incidents; and aggravated assaults involve juveniles in 17.4% of incidents (see Figure 4.1). For property offenses, juveniles' risk of involvement is slightly lower than the overall average (7.1% in auto thefts; 6.3 for personal theft; and 4.9% in burglaries).


Figure 4.1. Percentage of Criminal Incidents that Involve a Juvenile as Either a Victim or Suspected Offender



Beyond offense type, Figure 4.2 below shows that juvenile involvement in crime (as either a victim or a suspected offender) also varies considerably by geographic context. Cincinnati has 52 distinct geographic neighborhoods, and juvenile involvement in crime ranges considerably across these neighborhoods. The neighborhoods with the highest percentage of juveniles involved in crime are in North Fairmont (17.1%), College Hill (16.5%), Winton Hills (16.0%), Evanston (14.9%), Millvale (14.2%), West Price Hill (14.2%), and East Price Hill (12.3%).


(with multiple crimes within those incidents) we used the hierarchy rule to cull the incident to its most serious offense for the analyses presented here-in.

Figure 4.2. Percentage of Criminal Incidents that Involve a Juvenile as Either a Victim or Suspected Offender (1/1/2022 – 12/31/2025)



Juvenile involvement in arrests mirrored those involved in crimes. Arrest data from the CPD from Jan 1, 2022 through Dec 31, 2025 indicates there were 36,294 arrestees with valid ages during this four-year period. Roughly 12.6% (N = 4,613) were of a juvenile (i.e., an arrestee 17 years or younger).⁵ As shown in Figure 4.3, juveniles were arrested in 11.6% of felony offenses and 13.5% of misdemeanor offenses.⁶

Figure 4.3. Percentage of CPD Arrests that Involve a Juvenile (17 years or younger)




As shown in Figure 4.4, there were a handful of neighborhoods in Cincinnati that had a high percentage of juveniles arrested among total arrests within the neighborhoods (i.e., percent of total arrests of which at least one of the arrestees was a juvenile). In Mount Auburn, nearly one out of every three total arrests involved a juvenile (30.4%). Likewise, in several other communities over one out of every four total arrests within those neighborhoods involved a juvenile, which included East End (28.7%), North Fairmont (27.3%), College Hill (25.5%), and Madisonville (25.0%).

⁵ A change in the data reporting system for arrests did not allow us to examine any arrest data prior to Jan 1, 2022. Additionally, for this four-year period there were 173 arrestees that did not include a valid age and were excluded from analyses (less than 0.5%).

⁶ Complete highest charge data were not available for 2,553 arrests; and, there was another 'highest charge' category which was 'sealed' (of which juveniles were only represented in 1.3%).

Figure 4.4. Percentage of Neighborhood Specific Arrests Where the Arrestee was a Juvenile (1/1/2022 – 12/31/2025)



The most common quantitative measures of social disadvantage and neighborhood disruption are percent in poverty, percent unemployed, percent female headed households, and percent new residents within the past five years (see Sampson et al., 1997). To gauge how the ULGSO-identified top 10 high-risk neighborhoods scored on these measures, we averaged each neighborhood's measures from the 2020 US Census and compared the pooled average of the top 10 neighborhoods (combined) relative to the remaining 42 Cincinnati neighborhoods. It is evident that each of the indicators of disadvantage and disruption were higher in the top 10 neighborhoods relative to the remainder of the city (see Figure 4.5). Thus, we are confident that the ULGSO identified neighborhoods were at higher risk than average Cincinnati neighborhoods (at least in terms of disruption and instability).

Figure 4.5. Community Risk Factors in Cincinnati Neighborhoods



PROCESS EVALUATION

The purpose of the process analysis is to provide an analytical description of the various programs and processes used by ULGSO that center on the goal of risk reduction for youth in high-risk contexts. We achieve this process analysis by using two primary data sources: 1) programming file reviews (including internal/external reports, de-identified case management files, and memos); and 2) qualitative interviews with project personnel.

Planning and Design

ULGSO's goal setting, strategy identification, and development of an implementation framework preceded the current study period but the capacity of its staff to reach these goals was enhanced by the ARPA funding. Since its inception, ULGSO's CPC and youth programming portfolio has focused on the goal of building community capacity to address crime, disorder,

and quality of life concerns through prevention-focused strategies in the Greater Cincinnati area.

The main strategies the CPC uses to reduce violence are addressing underlying community conditions and linking residents to services, supports, and opportunities that promote stability and well-being. The CPC relies on the SARA model (Scan, Analysis, Response, Assessment) to identify problems, analyze underlying causes, engage stakeholders, implement tailored interventions, and assess outcomes (Eck & Spelman, 1987). Its work combines this problem-solving approach with youth and adult engagement, while also strengthening trust and cooperation between law enforcement and community members to support safer neighborhoods (ULGSO, 2024).

Under the leadership of the CPC Executive Director, the operational framework to implement these strategies is two-pronged:

- Community Outreach Advocates engage directly with high-risk individuals participating in activities that put them at risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of violence through outreach, mentoring, violence interruption, and crisis response.
- Community Engagement Specialists work with community councils, safety committees, schools, faith organizations, service providers, and law enforcement to develop broader community responses.

Resource Allocation

The ULGSO's CPC and Youth Programs staff targets individuals participating in activities that may result in victimization or perpetration of violence, with a particular focus on African American communities disproportionately affected by gun violence. Informed by crime data provided by the CPD, CPC staff largely focus their efforts on the ten neighborhoods that historically experience the highest rates of violence, including Avondale, East Price Hill, Evanston, Mt. Airy, North Avondale, Over the Rhine, Roselawn, West End, Westwood, and Winton Hills. However, resource allocation is also responsive to emerging problems. The Government Square intervention (described in more detail at the end of this section) is the best example. The ULGSO temporarily shifted personnel away from neighborhood-based work and concentrated outreach staff at Government Square based on emerging concerns about youth violence and disorder at this transportation hub. Resource allocation was also described by staff as prioritizing immediate needs before longer-term goals. Individuals experiencing crises receive support that addresses those needs first, with employment, education, and other developmental services introduced only after immediate barriers are addressed.

During the ARPA funding period, the ULGSO allocated resources in a multi-faceted approach. A summary by type is provided below:

- ***Youth Programming (Outreach, Engagement, Summer Employment, and Referrals)***
 - As will be described in further detail in the Government Square case study, much of the youth outreach and engagement that ULGSO staff conducted in 2024 was focused on the Government Square location.⁷
 - Between February and May 2024, ULGSO staff engaged with over 700 youths and referred over 300 of them to the organization's Youth Programming or other resources that included food, clothing, housing, mental health, employment, and legal services.
 - Outside of the Government Square intervention, ULGSO staff served over 550 individuals (including youth) during the funding period.
 - Summer 2024: 70 enrolled youth began working at various businesses in Cincinnati as part of the ULGSO Urban Champions Summer Work Program.
 - Q4 2024: Over 70 enrolled youth participated in the ULGSO Urban Champions School-Based Cohort, covering leadership, civic engagement, and financial literacy.
- ***Response to Violent Incidents***
 - ULGSO staff responded to an average of 21 violent incidents per quarter, for a total of 115 from September 2023 to December 2024.
- ***Training***
 - Q4 2023: initiated 2nd cohort of teaching violence prevention problem-solving training through the youth mentoring program at Withrow High School with 15 participating sophomores receiving 10 weeks of SARA training.
 - Q4 2024: CPC transitioned the outreach component of the Government Square project to the Collaborative Community Outreach Workers by training them in the SARA model and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) to sustain field presence and engagement into 2025.
 - Q4 2024: The Avondale Community Council asked the CPC to collaborate on a community-wide response plan to address the rising gun violence in the area. Site visits were conducted to problem areas and ULGSO staff conducted SARA Training in that neighborhood, which was attended by 57 participants, and was

⁷ A case study analysis (on relevant outcomes related to arrests and criminal offenses) was conducted by the OSU research team to better assess what specific changes in crimes and arrests occurred at the Government Square location that corresponded with the timing of the ULGSO (and other citywide) efforts. More detail on this initiative is discussed below.

the launching point for ongoing monthly training for interested community members.

- **Community Resource Events**

- Q3 2024: The ULGSO hosted three large-scale resource events (Avondale, Winton Hills, Bright Star Community Church) serving nearly 1,000 residents.
- Q4 2024: The ULGSO participated in the Feed & Seed Resource Fairs, which served 212 families.

The ULGSO consistently collaborates with and draws upon community, criminal justice, and city leaders as resources for their initiatives. Recent meetings highlight ongoing collaboration with law enforcement, schools, and community residents, as well as partnerships with the Uptown Consortium, the University of Cincinnati (UC), and the CPD to access and analyze data for program improvement.

Self-Monitoring

The ULGSO relied on both formal data systems and informal community feedback mechanisms to strengthen data-driven practices, assess program implementation, and identify emerging challenges throughout the funding period. First, the ULGSO uses the VESTA case management system and related documentation tools to track participant engagement, enrollment, service delivery, referrals, outreach contacts, case notes, and program outcomes. Data collection focuses primarily on enrolled participants, while also distinguishing between transformational impact (ongoing enrollment), targeted impact (one-time events), and outreach (initial contact). Second, the ULGSO also regularly monitors violence trends through data provided by CPD and community intelligence gathered by outreach workers and community partners. These information sources help identify emerging problems and guide deployment decisions. Third, program staff obtain feedback through participant surveys, community events, and Youth Summit activities. Survey findings are used to identify participant concerns and inform future programming. Finally, staff also described monitoring program performance through community engagement metrics, attendance at resource fairs, outreach contacts, referrals, and mentoring participation.

Continuous Improvement

Throughout the ARPA funding period, the ULGSO leaders adjusted staffing structures, community training activities, community engagement efforts, and service offerings to maximize available resources and improve responsiveness to emerging issues. The Government Square intervention (described in more detail below) demonstrates continuous improvement in practice. Initial outreach focused on relationship-building, environmental assessment, and information gathering. As the initiative progressed, staff adapted strategies, developed behavior norms, created referral pathways, trained other outreach personnel, and eventually transitioned responsibilities to a broader collaborative outreach structure. Lessons

learned from Government Square informed later efforts in Avondale, Winton Hills, and other neighborhoods. The collaborative problem-solving framework was replicated and adapted to address new community concerns. Staff also noted that they were actively seeking ways to make programming more flexible and responsive to crises because traditional cohort-based programming often could not meet participants' immediate needs.

OUTCOME EVALUATION

In this section we document and describe the nine key pillars of successful youth violence intervention programs as documented by the Urban Institute's (2022) *Systematic Review of Youth Violence Prevention* programs. After describing each pillar, we assess how the ULGSO falls on the following scale:

O = Presumed or explicit absence

√ = Presumed or standard presence

√+ = Explicit or exceptional presence

1. Formalize Government's Role in Coordinating Antiviolence Work

"Local government has an important role to play in funding, coordinating, and supporting antiviolence work, although much of that work may be carried out by non-governmental organizations. Robust collaborative work done to reduce youth gun violence related to groups and gangs requires a varied toolkit that includes enforcement, intervention, prevention, and community engagement, and government is best positioned to situate each of these within an overall strategy" (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 11).

ULGSO Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: Since 2002, the CPC has partnered with the City of Cincinnati under the historic Collaborative Agreement, working to build positive police-community relations and address inequities that contributed to past unrest. The CPC has played a key role in initiatives such as the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) and Place-based Investigations in Violent Offender Territory (PIVOT), leveraging the SARA model for problem-solving. During the ARPA-funded study period, the ULGSO was specifically called upon by the City of Cincinnati and CPD partners for its youth violence prevention and intervention programs in Government Square. In addition, the ULGSO, through its CPC and Youth Programs, worked with multiple schools in the City of Cincinnati as well as community groups (for SARA training).

2. Fund and Enhance the Capacity of a Robust Community-Based Antiviolence Strategy

“Executing a robust community-based antiviolence strategy requires investing in the people and organizations that do antiviolence work, just as government at all levels has invested in traditional justice agencies and professionals. This investment starts with adequate funding and includes building broad and sustained antiviolence partnerships and investing in the antiviolence workforce and community violence interventions (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 17).”

ULGSO Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: The ULGSO has funding from diverse sources, including private donations, program-generated revenue, and state and local funds. Furthermore, they have a robust partnership network within the city, including the City Manager’s Office, Cincinnati Public Schools, SORTA/Metro, local businesses (Fifth Third Bank) and Cincinnati Center City Development Corporation (3CDC), CPD, and other judicial and legal components of the Cincinnati criminal justice system. Finally, ULGSO staff indicated feeling well supported within the organization. Each of these elements has contributed to the ULGSO’s ability to maintain and build capacity across multiple dimensions of community-based anti-violence work.

3. Engage the Community to Establish and Maintain Peace

“The community is an essential partner and can provide powerful resources for reducing violence and connecting with the community to make and keep the peace. Proactive peacemaking is an important component of violence reduction models; for instance, it could constitute the community mobilization component of the Comprehensive Gang Model or the norms and narratives work of the public health or focused deterrence models. Communities are complex and varied systems, and the forms that community engagement in antiviolence strategies can take are also varied. For community-based antiviolence strategies to be as successful as possible, they should happen in tandem with other intervention strategies (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 26).”

ULGSO Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: The ULGSO served as a hub and integrated itself across various spokes in private, criminal justice, and community partnerships during this period of evaluation. For example, the ULGSO’s CPC engaged community members in Avondale (training 57 participants) in SARA for an evidence-based community response to maintain peace. It also engaged over 1,000 residents in resource events (Avondale, Winton Hills, Bright Star Community Church). Finally, CPC engaged hundreds of youth with services for long-term risk reduction.

4. Calibrate the Relationship between Law Enforcement and Community Violence Interventions

“In communities experiencing high levels of gun violence, there is a deep distrust of the police rooted in the history of racial disparities in enforcement and the control of communities of

color, and there are large disparities in enforcement and use of force against youth of color. This was the area that people we interviewed in our scan of practices consistently named as a profound challenge to effective work to reduce youth gun and gang violence” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 30).

ULGSO Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: The ULGSO maintained a great balance of open communication with CPD while also using non-criminal justice responses to city problems. There are multiple ways in which the ULGSO drew upon their relationship with police in Cincinnati. First, the ULGSO relies on data and communication with CPD to ensure they are focused on the neighborhoods at the greatest risk for violence. Second, the ULGSO maintained relationships with the CPD in its Government Square intervention so that its professional staff could intervene in Government Square to minimize the CPD’s need to use suppression and arrest approaches to address some of the harms that were happening as part of the youth transient problems. Third, interviews indicated that ULGSO staff maintained points of contact at the CPD so they could be called upon to intervene when possible.

5. Collect and Share Data to Refine Practices and Assess Effectiveness

“It is critical that antiviolenence intervention stakeholders collect and report data to ensure antiviolenence work is done well, to correct course when needed, and to build and sustain efforts over the long term. But this requires investing in data and analysis capacity and committing to ensuring the data are actually put to use” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 34).

ULGSO Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: Three major dimensions emerged in the process evaluation of the ULGSO that determined the check-plus designation on data collection and sharing. First, the ULGSO uses the VESTA case management system and related documentation tools to track participant engagement, enrollment, service delivery, referrals, outreach contacts, case notes, and program outcomes. This allows them to routinely assess their operations and impact. Second, the ULGSO routinely uses CPD data, outreach worker observations, and information from community partners to monitor violence trends, identify emerging concerns, and inform deployment decisions. Finally, the ULGSO (CPC in particular) trained community members on SARA (the use of community-based data collection and evaluation) to community members. By showing how data are used, why they are used, and most importantly how they inform practice and interactions, ULGSO staff demonstrated through action the importance of data, not just for the evaluation but in the process of its interactions with youth and community members.

6. Assess the Problem to Focus Attention and Resources

“Research on the three primary program models indicates the importance of devoting time to up-front analysis and tailoring interventions to local conditions in supporting implementation

success, and our scan of practices substantiated the value of this practice, suggesting that ongoing routine assessment is critical for effective responses and continuous improvement” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 40).

ULGSO Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: The ULGSO (CPC) uses crime data from the CPD to determine its top 10 neighborhoods where they focus intensive resources. However, in the Government Square project, the ULGSO shifted away from the top 10 neighborhoods to focus their efforts specifically at and near Government Square. Again, the ULGSO also trained its community members on SARA techniques, showcasing the value of focusing efforts where data and problem analyses point them.

7. Build Positive Relationships with and Support Young People at High Risk of Gun and Gang/Group Violence

“The fact that it is a relatively small number of identifiable people who are at the highest risk of committing or falling victim to youth gun and group violence creates an opportunity to engage in focused proactive work to prevent violence through direct engagement that builds trusting relationships with youth at high risk. This kind of relational work is a core component of every approach to addressing youth gun and group violence, with the exception of standalone suppression” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 46).

ULGSO Scale Value: √

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: As noted previously, conflict resolution is a tool used by ULGSO members, particularly CPC. The primary partnerships for the ULGSO are positive prosocial movements and training, and certainly they have an imprint on attempting to resolve conflicts and tension among at-risk youth. However, focusing on youth gang and gun violence does not appear to be their primary focal point.

8. Interrupt and Mediate Conflicts

“Intervening in active conflicts is a core part of many different initiatives to address youth gun and group violence because such a large portion of gun violence is based on intergroup dynamics and retaliatory cycles. Conflict interruption has two aspects: acute response to shootings to prevent further spread of violence from an incident that has already occurred, and proactive work to mediate emergent or ongoing intergroup conflicts” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 58).

ULGSO Scale Value: √

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: As noted in the process evaluation, CPC officials provided de-escalation and conflict resolution, particularly in schools where students who were at risk for retaliation or violence were specifically focused upon for personnel and resources.

Additionally, interviews suggested that ULGSO workers were also interested in reducing stress between individuals at Government Square as part of their intervention mechanisms.

9. Use Suppression and Enforcement Precisely and Sparingly

“The roles of suppression and enforcement have to be carefully defined and bounded in a successful and sustainable youth violence reduction effort” (Jannetta et al., 2022: p. 62).

ULGSO Scale Value: √+

Rationale for Scale Value Selection: The case study of the Government Square initiative highlights and showcases that CPD did not want to use arrests for juveniles despite the high risk of crime being committed juveniles in Government Square. The overall initiative which included ULGSO personnel (but also included other city officials as well as policy and legal changes over time) indicates strongly that suppression and targeted enforcement were not the goals. Arrests (and offenses) involving juveniles did not increase in the Government Square location, though they did increase elsewhere in the City of Cincinnati at the same period. The ULGSO and city officials did not want to draw upon enhanced enforcement and attempted to use positive prosocial mediators from the CPC and other city agencies to curb the problem in real time.

ULGSO – GOVERNMENT SQUARE CASE STUDY

In January 2024, City of Cincinnati representatives asked the ULGSO’s Community Partnering Center to collaborate with other city partners and community representatives to address the increase in youth violence and disorder in the area of Government Square in downtown Cincinnati. The ULGSO agreed, and, as this engagement by ULGSO staff occurred during the period during which the organization’s efforts were supported by the OCJS ARPA award, the research team determined it provided a timely place- and time-specific opportunity to examine the ULGSO community violence intervention professionals’ role in the collaborative intervention that occurred in Government Square.⁸

In this case study, we describe the background and historical context of Government Square, the intervention approaches used by ULGSO officials (and within the context of other agencies in Cincinnati), and conduct descriptive and inferential analyses of crime and arrest data to determine whether the timing of the community violence intervention approaches in Cincinnati were associated with any potential change, or risk reduction, in crime and arrests for at-risk youth in the Government Square and nearby locations. The lessons learned and

⁸ It is important to note that CND in Columbus also engaged in community crime prevention strategies; however, the context of Cincinnati *during this specific evaluation period* provided an opportunity for evaluation that was unique for ULGSO. The lessons learned from this evaluation transcend Cincinnati and are applicable to additional contexts.

implications for this type of conflict intervention are highlighted in the conclusion to demonstrate how violence interrupters have the potential to impact real-world problems.

Government Square: Context and History

Government Square is a centralized hub for public transportation in Cincinnati. The issues in Government Square that formed the basis for this case study stemmed from a post-COVID decision by Cincinnati Public Schools (CPS) District officials to eliminate special bus routes that students had historically relied upon due, in part, to bus driver staffing shortages (Planalp, 2021). Beyond the changes in commute time to school, as well as scheduling and transportation challenges that students' faced with this shift, this change was associated with an uptick in truancy, and adolescent anti-social behavior (fighting, litter, graffiti, vandalism) in the Government Square (transit) center area with the influx of student riders, some of which stayed at Government Square rather than attending school (see Buganski, 2025a). School administrators and city officials attempted to address this emergent problem using a variety of different approaches (e.g., police response, school bus options, community involvement, and collaboration with vested groups of experts) over the past few years (LeBus & O'Rourke, 2024; Ordonez, 2025).

Role of ULGSO at Government Square

At the request of City of Cincinnati partners, the ULGSO became involved in the collaborative approach to problem solving and addressing teen behavior at Government Square. Table 4.1 displays the extensive partnership network involved in this intervention. For the ULGSO to support these efforts, the ULGSO temporarily diverted outreach that normally focuses on the top 10 neighborhoods for crime and violence to the specific Government Square area. The ULGSO Community Outreach Advocates (COAs) implemented a daily presence in the area from 2 to 7 PM to build relationships with youth and provide resources. Initially, the COAs focused on observing interactions, identifying who youth admired and associated with, establishing trust, monitoring student transfers and idle time, de-escalating conflicts, and providing gentle discipline. The team's consistent presence, including offering food and snacks through an initiative called "Snack & Chat," helped establish behavior norms and identify vulnerable youth, including those who were homeless or unaccompanied. Between February and May 2024, ULGSO staff engaged over 700 youth in conversations and referred over 300 of them to the organization's Youth Programming or other resources that included food, clothing, housing, mental health, employment, and legal services.

Table 4.1. Government Square Partnership Network

Sector(s)	Key Partners and Their Contributions to Government Square Intervention
City Government & Law Enforcement	City of Cincinnati, CPD, City Manager's Office – coordination, enforcement alignment, and shared data.
Education & Transit Systems	CPS, SORTA/Metro – student travel management, communication protocols, ridership conduct codes, and schedule adjustments.
Private Sector & Business Anchors	5th Third Bank (Fountain Square), 3CDC – place management, funding support, and civic volunteer coordination.
Judicial & Legal Partners	Federal Courthouse officials, Hamilton County Juvenile Court – diversion strategies, data exchange, and prevention-focused collaboration.
Community & Nonprofit Organizations	Collaborative Outreach Team, Urban League of Greater Southwestern Ohio, volunteer city residents – outreach continuity, youth mentorship, and civic participation.

By the end of the 2023-2024 school year, the CPC began laying the groundwork for a sustainability plan, training partners to assume daily outreach roles. In the fall of 2024, the ULGSO transitioned the outreach component of the Government Square project to the Collaborative Community Outreach Workers, who were trained by CPC in both SARA and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) to sustain field presence and engagement into 2025.


Case Study Analysis and Findings

As part of the current CVI research, and to situate the ULGSO's involvement in the broader crime prevention approach adopted by Cincinnati city officials, we conducted a series of trend analyses on relevant outcomes of interest to examine what potential shifts in crime and arrests (in particular, those involving 18-year-olds and younger) shifted over the current study period. The specific questions we sought to answer include: 1) Did Government Square experience any significant changes in crimes and arrests? 2) Were there changes in the surrounding area adjacent to Government Square? 3) What changes did the remainder of Cincinnati have for these same outcomes. From a counterfactual framework, we hypothesize that if the intervention strategies were successful, there would be a discernable and detectable shift in violence post-implementation.

We examined two sources of data collected from the CPD for the period between Jan 1, 2022 and Dec 31, 2025: arrests and criminal incident reports. For all data, we mapped the crime and arrest reports to: 1) the Government Square Boundary; 2) the adjacent blocks near it; and 3)

the remainder of the city. Figure 4.5 below displays the geographic boundaries for Government Square and adjacent areas within the confines of Downtown Cincinnati.

Figure 4.5. Government Square and Adjacent Area Boundary



As noted previously, CPS students began to traverse to their educational campuses through Government Square in fall 2021 as a response to budget constraints (after the 2020 COVID shutdown). Thus, the first year of data in this study, 2022 reflects an already existent shift in CPS students utilizing Government Square services. However, additional shifts emerged over this period, with an emphasis on: 1) the Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement (which simultaneously overlapped with ARPA funding to ULGSO as part of a more comprehensive approach to violence prevention), 2) the beginning of the 2024 academic school year (after the spring/summer ARPA/Collaborative Agreement intervention strategies); and 3) the broader City of Cincinnati Act for Cincinnati initiative. Detailed descriptions of these data, statistical models, and graphs associated with the interrupted time series analysis of the Government Square case study are provided in Appendix A. However, here we note several key findings from the analysis.

The primary results include:

- There is *no empirical evidence* of any type of increase in crime or arrests within the Government Square geographic context. Indeed, some outcomes at this location have experienced unique and distinct *declines*. Across the three time series periods we examined:
 - Total crime and total arrests experienced significant declines in Government Square

- Neither criminal offenses with juvenile suspects nor criminal offenses with juvenile victims significantly shifted
- Total arrests involving those 18 and younger did not significantly change
- The areas adjacent to Government Square had mixed changes, with *statistically significant increases* in total crime and arrests, but null findings for youth-specific criminal victimization and arrests, suggesting the declines in youth-specific crimes and arrests in Government Square were not due to displacement to the adjacent area.
 - Total crimes and total arrests in the area adjacent to Government Square experienced statistically significant increases across multiple time series breaks
 - Crimes with juvenile suspects increased (via marginally statistically significant results) in the adjacent area to Government Square
 - Crimes with juvenile victims did not change in the area adjacent to Government Square
 - Arrests of individuals 18 and younger did not experience any significant change
- The remainder of Cincinnati had *significant increases* in most of these events between 2022 and 2025 (with peaks emerging in late 2024/early 2025). Specifically, across the remainder of Cincinnati:
 - Total arrests experienced statistically significant increases
 - Crime with at least one juvenile suspect experienced statistically significant increases
 - Crime with at least one juvenile victim experienced statistically significant increases
 - Arrests of individuals 18 and younger experienced statistically significant increases
 - Only total crimes showed a slight overall decline

In short, the results indicate that the intervention area (Government Square) experienced mostly stability in juvenile crime and arrests as well as evidence of statistically significant declines on total crime (-29.5%) and total arrests (-22.2%). Comparatively, the adjacent areas to Government Square experienced significant increases in juvenile crime and arrests (which ranged in impact depending on the intervention date, see Appendix A), as well as total crime (+29.9%) and total arrests (+64.0%). Moreover, the remainder of Cincinnati also experienced divergent shifts in juvenile crime and arrests, as well as less pronounced changes in total crime (-4.4%) and total arrests (+9.6%). Combined these findings suggest a potential moderating protective effect at Government Square which was unique and distinct.

Government Square was certainly an “at risk” place for potential problems given the increased traffic of juveniles through the area for school transportation. The results of this case-study

demonstrate that integrating community-based prosocial outreach and conflict resolution tactics (i.e., street work advocates reaching out to youth in a high-risk context) corresponded with a lower level of youth-specific crime and arrests, while comparison areas experienced significant increases in the same outcomes. This suggests there was at least some type of mediating mechanism that occurred in Government Square, which is important to note because it was a centralized focal point for school officials, police officers, community violence workers, and community members. Notably, CPD officers did not use aggressive enforcement (i.e., arrests) to reduce juvenile crime. Rather, these analyses suggest they did the opposite by collaborating with non-policing entities who could engage with the at-risk youth to resolve disputes and conflicts, provide prosocial contacts, and make referrals to needed services.

The Government Square Project demonstrates how the ULGSO's CPC integrated collaborative problem solving, environmental design, youth engagement, and expanded networks of capacity to reduce the risks associated with youth traversing public transportation hubs to attend school(s) in the greater Cincinnati area. Ultimately, this initiative required coordinated government systems, schools, private businesses, and residents under one public safety strategy. The project showcases how the CPC used data, partnerships, and training to achieve measurable reductions in youth violence while building lasting community capacity. Future CVI sites can replicate the ULGSO process by being engaged with city officials and providing youth services so that when a citywide opportunity to engage in a targeted intervention presents itself, they too can be ready to offer their assistance.

5.CONCLUSION

The purpose of this report was to examine the implementation and the impact of community-based violence interventions in Cincinnati and Columbus. CVI and problem-solving approaches have demonstrated the capacity to reduce harmful conditions, in a variety of contexts, by relying on prosocial mediators to resolve systematic problems. This report assesses how CVI organizations in Columbus (CND) and Cincinnati (ULGSO) determined which problems to focus on, in what contexts, and to what extent their efforts were effective and align with their stated goals and best practices.

Summary of Findings

The findings from this evaluation indicate that the CND and ULGSO operate largely as designed and were successfully integrated into the Cities of Columbus and Cincinnati (respectively) as viable resources to enhance community engagement and violence prevention. Both organizations' strategies and implementation frameworks demonstrate alignment with evidence-based best practices for community-based violence interventions.

Key personnel focus on prevention-focused and prosocial approaches to engage at-risk youth to provide viable and sustainable alternatives to crime, delinquency, and justice system involvement. Process and outcome findings suggest that both organizations maintained formal roles in local antiviolence efforts, engaged community members in problem solving, used data to guide decision-making, built positive relationships with youth, relied on conflict mediation and supportive services rather than enforcement-oriented responses, and cultivated collaborative partnerships with schools, other community organizations, public agencies, and criminal justice system stakeholders.

A second key finding is that both organizations demonstrated the ability to adapt their strategies to local conditions and emerging problems. Rather than relying on a single intervention model, the ULGSO and CND employed a range of prevention and intervention activities based on the specific needs of the communities they served. These efforts included school-based conflict mediation, youth mentoring, after-school and summer programming, violence interruption activities, workforce development opportunities, and targeted responses to emerging community concerns such as the Government Square transportation-related youth violence issues. Across both sites, staff drew upon multiple sources of information, including crime data, participant feedback, community input, referrals, and programmatic data, to identify priorities and allocate resources where they were most needed. This flexibility and responsiveness emerged as a defining feature of both organizations' approaches.

Finally, the evaluation suggests that the ARPA funding provided by the OCJS strengthened existing organizational capacity and allowed both organizations to expand their prevention and intervention efforts. Rather than creating entirely new programs, the funding enhanced

existing infrastructure by supporting personnel, outreach activities, service delivery, and partnership development. In both Columbus and Cincinnati, these investments increased organizations' ability to engage youth, respond to emerging conflicts, connect participants to resources, and collaborate with local stakeholders. Taken together, the findings suggest that community-based violence intervention organizations can serve as valuable complements to traditional public safety strategies when they are adequately resourced, guided by data, integrated into broader community networks, and afforded the flexibility to tailor responses to local conditions.

CHALLENGES AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES

While both organizations demonstrated considerable successes and strengths, CVI staff from the CND and ULGSO also identified several challenges common to CVI work and described strategies they used to mitigate them. In this section, we synthesize this information to provide guidance and practical examples for other organizations or jurisdictions seeking to implement or expand community violence intervention efforts.

Building and Maintaining Trust and Credibility

Staff from both organizations consistently described trust and credibility as foundational to successful violence intervention work. Trust takes time to develop and can be lost quickly if commitments are not honored or if youth perceive staff as inauthentic. To build trust, staff from both organizations emphasized maintaining a visible and reliable community presence, participating in neighborhood events, demonstrating genuine concern for and interest in participants' lives, and employing staff with strong community ties and lived experience.

Sustaining Participant Engagement

While establishing initial contact with youth was important, staff from both organizations noted that maintaining engagement over time was often more challenging. Staff stressed the importance of responding quickly when youth expressed interest in services, recognizing that opportunities for engagement may be brief and difficult to reestablish. Both organizations worked to maintain regular contact with participants, connect them to needed resources, and build networks of support involving family members, schools, employers, and community organizations. Participants frequently face barriers such as financial instability, housing insecurity, transportation difficulties, limited family support, and legal obstacles such as prior criminal records that affected employment opportunities, academic achievement, and other goal setting. To address these challenges, staff emphasized the importance of anticipating and helping to navigate these potential barriers. By meeting youth where they were, tailoring services and expectations to individual circumstances, and helping participants establish small, achievable goals, this allows the youth to realistically achieve incremental progress and remain motivated. These strategies helped sustain engagement and increase the likelihood that participants would remain connected to services long enough to sustain positive outcomes.

Recruitment, Retention, and Staff Well-Being

Both organizations reported that hiring and retaining qualified personnel can be difficult. Violence intervention often extends beyond traditional work hours, exposes staff to trauma and crisis situations, and requires a level of commitment that is not suitable for every employee. Staff emphasized the importance of recruiting individuals with strong community ties, lived experience, and a genuine commitment to serving youth. Organizations attempted to mitigate stress and burnout by fostering supportive workplace cultures, conducting regular team check-ins, encouraging professional development opportunities, and providing wellness support for staff. Participants also emphasized the value of engaging trained volunteers, community leaders, recreation centers, health clinics, and other local partners to supplement organizational capacity and expand community reach.

Meeting Complex and Immediate Client Needs

Staff described the wide range of needs presented by program participants, including employment assistance, housing support, food insecurity, transportation barriers, workforce development, educational opportunities, and record-sealing or expungement assistance. Many of these needs require immediate attention, creating challenges for organizations operating with limited resources. To address these issues, both organizations emphasized the importance of flexible programming that can respond rapidly to emerging opportunities and crises. Staff noted that support must often be provided at the moment an individual expresses readiness to engage in services. Case management systems, service tracking, and ongoing follow-up were used to coordinate referrals and monitor participant progress. When services could not be provided directly, CND staff described using "warm handoffs" to connect participants with trusted partner organizations that could address unmet needs.

Sustaining Community Credibility While Collaborating with Law Enforcement

Participants from both organizations discussed the challenges associated with maintaining productive relationships with law enforcement while preserving community trust. Community violence intervention staff noted that youth and other community members may become reluctant to engage if they perceive outreach workers as acting on behalf of law enforcement or sharing information with police. As a result, both organizations described maintaining professional relationships with law enforcement agencies while preserving organizational independence. For example, CND staff explained that communication with law enforcement generally occurs through organizational leadership rather than frontline intervention personnel so that these individuals can maintain credibility as community-based advocates rather than enforcement agents. The experiences of both organizations suggest that effective CVI programs are able to collaborate with criminal justice partners when needed while maintaining sufficient distance to preserve trust and legitimacy among the communities they serve. In particular, the Government Square intervention in Cincinnati demonstrated how professional relationships between community violence intervention organizations like the

ULGSO, city officials, and law enforcement can create opportunities to rely on outreach, conflict mediation, service referrals, and youth engagement rather than enforcement-oriented responses.

LESSONS LEARNED

Several key lessons emerged from the evaluations of the CND and ULGSO that may inform future community violence intervention efforts.

- **Use data to identify problems and guide resource allocation.** Both organizations relied on multiple sources of information, including crime data, referrals, community feedback, and direct engagement with youth, to identify emerging challenges and tailor interventions to local conditions. Effective CVI efforts were not driven by a single program model but by the ability to adapt strategies to specific community and youth needs.
- **Relationships and credibility are foundational.** Staff consistently emphasized that trust must be earned through authentic engagement, visible community presence, follow-through on commitments, and sustained support. Building positive relationships with youth and families was viewed as essential to successful violence prevention and intervention efforts.
- **Strong partnerships increase effectiveness.** Both organizations leveraged partnerships with schools, courts, service providers, local government agencies, community organizations, and law enforcement. At the same time, maintaining organizational independence and community credibility remained critical to successful implementation.
- **Continuous assessment and improvement support long-term success.** Both organizations used case management systems, performance monitoring, participant feedback, and ongoing documentation to assess progress, refine services, and improve implementation over time.

Taken together, these lessons closely align with the evidence-based practice areas identified by the Urban Institute, particularly the importance of building antiviolence infrastructure, engaging communities, collecting and using data, focusing resources on clearly defined problems, building positive relationships with high-risk youth, and maintaining strong collaborative partnerships. The experiences of the CND and ULGSO demonstrate how these principles can be translated into practice within Ohio communities.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the findings from this evaluation suggest that community violence intervention programs have the potential to address a variety of crime and violence problems when they are tailored to local conditions and supported by strong partnerships. The specific approaches used by the CND and ULGSO had some differences, but both organizations relied on data,

community engagement, conflict mediation, youth development, and collaborative problem solving with community partners to guide their efforts. The ARPA funding enhanced the ability of both organizations to expand staffing, outreach, partnerships, and service delivery to better respond to emerging community needs. Importantly, these findings demonstrate that community-based organizations can serve as valuable resources for local governments, schools, service providers, and public safety agencies seeking alternatives to enforcement-focused responses. Future violence prevention efforts should continue to emphasize flexibility, relationship building, and data-informed decision making so that interventions can be adapted to the unique risks and challenges present within individual communities.

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APPENDIX A: INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES FOR CINCINNATI GOVERNMENT SQUARE ANALYSIS

The main findings from the analyses detailed here are presented in Section 4. This appendix provides more specific descriptions of data, statistical models, and graphs associated with the interrupted time series analysis of the Government Square case study.

DATA

We examined two sources of data collected from the Cincinnati Police Department for the period between Jan 1, 2022 and Dec 31, 2025⁹: arrests and criminal incident reports.¹⁰ From these data sources, crime and arrest counts are operationalized in monthly frequencies as follows:

- (1) Total crime: Crimes are measured at the offense level and partitioned into Part I (more serious offenses including burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and homicide) and Part II offenses (less serious offenses including but not limited to breaking and entering, stalking, simple assaults, fraud, illegally discharged firearms, forgery, and embezzlement), consistent with National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) reporting.¹¹

⁹ For time series and trend analyses it is optimal to have a lengthy pre-intervention series to assess trend stability over time. For this study, we could only analyze Jan 2022 – Dec 2025 data because the 2021 data had a change in its construction, in particularly for arrests. This change also was impactful to criminal offense reports. Thus, for the highest reliability possible, we constrained this examination to 2022 to 2025.

¹⁰ It is important to note that ARPA funding that supported many of the personnel in this study expired on Dec 31, 2024. However, the Government Square location continues to be a focal point for city officials to address the location as a potential high-risk hot spot. Thus, we expanded our analysis through 2025 as a one-year follow-up (post-funding) period.

¹¹ Descriptive analyses indicate that the vast majority of criminal incidents in Cincinnati data have a single offense reported (96.0% of all Cincinnati criminal incidents of the 120,000 + incidents examined over this four-year period). Of those incidents that have multiple offenses (4% in the city, and 3.4% at Government Square specifically, or N = 8 of the 235 incidents at Government Square between 2022 and 2025), the offense reports with the same incident number are typically a combination of Part I and/or Part II offenses. In this case, the single incident accounts for two criminal offenses in our monthly crime counts.

- (2) Total arrests: Measured as the number of arrestees (i.e., the number of individuals arrested by Cincinnati Police Department) between 2022 and 2025.¹²
- (1) Crime with at least one Juvenile Suspect¹³: For this analysis crime is measured as the count of *incidents* that have at least one juvenile suspect. This is to ensure that incidents with multiple criminal offenses are not counted more than once.
- (2) Crime with at least one Juvenile Victim: Similarly, for this analysis, crime is measured as the count of *incidents* that have at least one juvenile victim.
- (3) Arrests for Individuals 18 and Younger: Measured as the number of arrestees that were of individuals 18 years and younger.¹⁴

INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES (ITS) REGRESSION

Interrupted time series (ITS) modeling is a statistical technique that provides a robust quasi-experimental counterfactual framework, particularly when treatment-to-control matching is not possible or when targeted outcome measures are unavailable in non-treatment settings (Cook & Campbell, 1979). ITS assesses whether there are statistically significant differences in the average frequency of an outcome (i.e., event counts such as crimes reported or arrests made) across repeated measures of the outcome that correspond with period-specific events or interventions (i.e., a before/after design with a designated, distinct, and unique pre/post period). For the current research, we employed a pre/post time-series statistical design Generalized Linear Modeling (GLM) regression analysis (Long, 1997) to assess changes in the counts of outcomes of interest (i.e., criminal offenses and arrests) across various locations (Government Square, its surrounding area, and the rest of Cincinnati). Each outcome was examined using a conditional Poisson distribution across different geographic contexts (Berk & MacDonald, 2008; Osgood, 2000).

All interrupted time series models include a unique temporal covariate, which are dummy coded (0/1) period specific measures to reflect three specific points in time: pre/post Collaborative Agreement Community Care Initiative (1/22 – 1/24 = 0; 2/24 – 12/25 = 1); the 2024 CPS school year onset (1/22 – 7/24 = 0; 8/24 – 12/25 = 1); and the post-ARPA broader community violence prevention initiative across the city, Act Cincinnati (1/22 – 12/24 = 0; 1/25 – 12/25 = 1). Due to model overlap (multicollinearity) between the measures, we can only present one

¹² The lone caveat to this description is a circumstance where the same individual is arrested multiple times for multiple incidents. For example, a person arrested for theft in 2022 and again for another theft in 2024 will represent two arrestees (though they are the same person).

¹³ The data provided by Cincinnati Police Department did not include unique identifiers, but did include data fields denoting whether the suspect and/or victim was a juvenile or adult.

¹⁴ Again, no unique identifiers were provided for arrestees. However, the age (in years) of the arrestee at the time of arrest was included. Therefore, we analyze those arrests since it is estimated that between 75% to 80% of high school seniors are 18 years old at graduation (see Heenton, 2025).

estimate per outcome. We also include monthly dummy variables (modeled but not displayed for efficiency) to control for seasonal fluctuations in crime and arrests. These time periods were selected for the following reasons:¹⁵

- (1) **Collaborative Agreement/ULGSO Begins Involvement in Government Square (February 2024).** In an excerpt from the ULGSO's Quarter 4 Summary Report submitted to OCJS, it states that on January 31, 2024, collaborators of the city of Cincinnati asked the Community Partnering Center to help problem-solve the uptick in youth violence on and around Government Square in downtown Cincinnati. ULGSO members pivoted from neighborhood violence interventions to a focused attention on Government Square with support of ARPA funding for personnel. This period aligns with the City of Cincinnati's signing of the Collaborative Agreement Community Care Initiative (see LeBus and O'Rourke, 2024).
- (2) **Onset of 2024 CPS School Year (August 2024).** This reflects the conclusion of many youth summer programs, such as those operated by ULGSO, and other community outreach initiatives, and a return to school (and the increase in public transportation through Government Square for CPS students).
- (3) **Act for Cincinnati (January 2025).** This period reflects the City of Cincinnati's devotion to a broader comprehensive violence prevention program. It also represents the conclusion of ARPA supportive funds for ULGSO and generally reflects a more diffuse violence prevention strategy from a community collaboration standpoint (Buganski, 2025b).

For the presentation (and subsequent interpretation) of findings, we note three key dynamics for consideration. First, all outcomes (by geography) are presented independently in their own unique graphs. Second, any of the graphs that did not have a corresponding statistically significant time series 'shift' in the outcomes ($\leq .10$ alpha level) will only display the linear graph. Conversely, for all-time series that corresponded with a 'statistically significant' break or shift in the time series, we present the pre/post break with its corresponding shift date and the pre/post average changes. Third, in the event of 'multiple' significant shifts in the time series, we present the shift in the graph that corresponds with the largest effect size change, but the exact point estimates for each of the models estimated are presented in tabular format.¹⁶

¹⁵ It is important to note that for most of the months in 2024 there were 'periods' of initiatives which could be included as onset periods based on discussions with Cincinnati Police Department officials. We selected these three distinct data points as those distinct periods that aligned between City of Cincinnati, Cincinnati Police Department, and ULGSO time periods. Additionally, there are moderate period breaks between the three phases here allowing for a more 'precise estimation of timing changes.'

¹⁶ The two parameters used for this decision was the lowest Log Pseudolikelihood statistic and the largest point estimate across models. The reason we presented only the largest effect size change was due to the fact that

TRENDS IN CRIME AND ARRESTS: DESCRIPTIVE TRENDS AND TIME SERIES ANALYSES

In this section, we center our discussion around the bivariate line graphs in trends and shifts across these three distinct time periods for each outcome. We support our primary discussions with the use of interrupted time series analyses to delineate which shifts in outcomes (at specific points in time) occurred beyond chance versus those that were likely more than variations in measurement error (using 90% and 95% probability thresholds). The outcomes of interest are monthly event counts of total and age-specific criminal offenses and monthly event counts of total and age-specific arrests. All analyses include a geographic-specific focus: (1) Government Square area, (2) Government Square's nearby adjacent properties, and (3) the remainder of city (total city minus Government Square and its adjacent neighborhoods).

While our research team is confident in the rigor of the methodological design and the robust nature of the findings within the analyses, we note two interrelated limitations which we advise readers consider when interrupting the results presented here-in. First, it is important to understand that ITS designs do not provide a rigorous control condition (e.g., trends of juvenile crime and arrest in a nearby city), nor are they impervious to history effects and co-intervention contamination (see Ewusie et al., 2020). Second, and related to co-intervention concerns, there were multiple co-interventions in the City of Cincinnati by Cincinnati Public Schools, city officials, and the MARTA bus services to attempt to discourage truancy and loitering. Our results do not disentangle these potential co-effects. Thus, we recommend caution in interpreting the ITS results.

1. Total Criminal Offenses

Given that there has been a concentrated focus on Government Square (as a potential 'hot spot' for crime and police responses in terms of the potential use of arrest), we first mapped and analyzed the crime counts that took place specifically within this concentrated geographic boundary. These monthly counts are graphically displayed in Figure A.1. The interrupted time series (Table A.1) demonstrates a statistically significant decline in the total number of criminal offenses in Government Square (1/25 – 12/25) when compared to the pre-period (1/22 – 12/24) – which corresponded with the implementation of Act for Cincinnati timeline ($B = -.286, p < .05$), net of monthly controls for seasonal effects. In terms of raw count changes, on average there were 4.4 total offenses per month in Government Square from 1/22 to 12/24, which declined to 3.1 total offenses per month from 1/25 to 12/25 (see Figure A.1).

multiple trend lines often overlapped, which would make the physical display of the graphics unnecessarily complicated (in that the effect sizes were often similar across trends).

Figure A.1. Total Offenses Government Square, 1/22 – 12/25





Table A.1. Total Crime Time Series

	Model 1: Collaborative Agreement Estimate		Model 2: 2024 Start of School Year Estimate		Model 3: Act for Cincinnati Estimate	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Total Crime – Government Square						
Covariate						
Post Feb 2024	-0.180	0.121	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	-0.242 ⁺	0.131	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	-0.286 ⁺	0.143
Intercept	1.36 ⁺	0.148	1.36 ⁺	0.148	1.37 ⁺	0.141
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-93.56		-93.57		-93.15	
(Pseudo R ²)	(0.037)		(0.037)		(0.041)	
Total Crime – Adjacent Area to Government Square						
Covariate						
Post Feb 2024	0.168 ⁺	0.094	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	0.231 ⁺	0.101	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	0.233 ⁺	0.104
Intercept	2.63 ⁺	0.135	2.61 ⁺	0.144	2.61 ⁺	0.144
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-152.4		-150.6		-150.2	
(Pseudo R ²)	(0.103)		(0.116)		(0.114)	
Total Crime – Remainder of Cincinnati						
Covariate						
Post Feb 2024	-0.053 ⁺	0.015	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	-0.051 ⁺	0.016	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	-0.048 ⁺	0.016
Intercept	7.50 ⁺	0.035	7.50 ⁺	0.035	7.49 ⁺	0.035
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-376.9		-390.6		-397.4	
(Pseudo R ²)	(0.621)		(0.600)		(0.601)	

⁺p < 0.05; ⁺p < 0.10


The adjacent geographic area to Government Square did not experience the same declines that were observed in the previous Government Square analyses. More specifically, total offenses in the adjacent area experienced consistent statistically significant increases (seen in Table A.1, Models 1 – 3 and graphically displayed in Figure A.2). The most sizable and robust increase in total offenses in the adjacent area was observed after January 2025 (the period corresponding with Act for Cincinnati) ($B = 0.233$, $p < 0.05$). On average there were 16.4 total offenses per month in the adjacent area to Government Square from 1/22 to 12/24, which increased to 21.3 total offenses per month from 1/25 to 12/25 (see Figure A.2). The largest spike in the offenses here occurred in summer 2025.

Figure A.2. Total Offenses Adjacent Area to Government Square, 1/22 – 12/25



To provide a more general contextual analysis as to whether a global trend, or shift, in total - offense was observed across the City of Cincinnati during this same period, we analyzed all total offenses that occurred outside of Government Square and its adjacent neighborhood context. There was a robust, consistent, albeit minor (in terms of effect sizes) overall decline in total offenses outside of these two focal points of the study thus far. Each of the regressions demonstrated a significant decline in total offenses over this time series, with the most sizable and consistent decline occurring with the implementation of the Collaborative Agreement (2/24 – 12/25) when compared to its pre-period (1/22-1/24) counterfactual ($B = -0.053$, $p < 0.05$). The average number of total offenses in the rest of the city declined from 2,144 per month to 2,049 per month.

Figure A.3. Total Offenses Remainder of Cincinnati, 1/22 – 12/25



Summary: The changes in total offenses across the three geographic areas of interest demonstrate three noteworthy patterns: 1) the remainder of Cincinnati had a slight, albeit consistent (over time), decline in total offenses from 2022 through 2025. 2) The Government Square area also experienced a decline in total offenses, but the decline at this location was not universal and gradual. There was a sharper, more pronounced decline in total offenses in Government Square, particularly when comparing 2025 with 2022-2024. 3) The nearby adjacent area experienced a shift, or increase, in total crime, the latter half of 2025 when compared to 2022-2024.

2. Total Arrests

We next move to an analysis of total arrests across the various geographic contexts. Government Square experienced a non-significant reduction in arrests over this study period, though when comparing the onset of the August 2024 school year with its pre-period counterfactual (1/22 – 7/24), the estimate was marginally statistically significant ($B = -0.364$, $p < 0.10$). During the shift, arrests declined from 4.5 per month (from 1/22 – 7/24) to 3.5 per month (from 8/24 – 12/25). These trends are graphically displayed in Figure A.4 and the specific point estimates for the interrupted time series models are provided in Table A.2

Figure A.4. Total Arrests Government Square, 1/22 – 12/25





Table A.2. Total Arrest Time Series

Total Arrests – Government Square						
	Model 1: Collaborative Agreement Estimate		Model 2: 2024 Start of School Year Estimate		Model 3: Act for Cincinnati Estimate	
Covariate	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Post Feb 2024	-0.193	0.182	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	-0.364 ⁺	0.201	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	-0.313	0.211
Intercept	1.65 ⁺	0.234	1.68 ⁺	0.218	1.68 ⁺	0.223
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-110.1		-108.3		-109.2	
(Pseudo R ²)	(0.119)		(0.134)		(0.126)	
Total Arrests – Adjacent Area to Government Square						
Covariate						
Post Feb 2024	0.497 ⁺		--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	0.371 ⁺	0.145	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	0.418 ⁺	0.147
Intercept	1.55 ⁺	.376	1.59 ⁺	0.364	1.58 ⁺	0.369
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-118.8		-123.1		-122.1	
(Pseudo R ²)	(0.116)		(0.083)		(0.091)	
Total Arrests – Remainder of Cincinnati						
Covariate						
Post Feb 2024	0.068 ⁺	0.017	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	0.075 ⁺	0.019	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	0.085 ⁺	0.021
Intercept	6.42 ⁺	0.042	6.43 ⁺	0.043	6.42 ⁺	0.044
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-264.3		-263.0		-258.7	
(Pseudo R ²)	(0.278)		(0.282)		(0.293)	

⁺p < 0.05; *p < 0.10


Conversely, total arrests in the areas adjacent to Government Square experienced statistically significant increases across each of the three temporal distributions used in the time series. The largest and most robust increase in arrests occurred when modeling the Collaborative Agreement period (1/24 – 12/25) compared with its pre-period (1/22 – 12/23) ($B=0.497$, $p < 0.05$) (see Model 1 in Table A.2). Figure A.5 shows that arrests increased from 5.5 per month to over 9.0 per month.

Figure A.5. Total Arrests Adjacent Area to Government Square, 1/22 – 12/25



A similar shift in total arrests was observed across the Remainder of Cincinnati; all three time-series breaks revealed statistically significant increases over time. The largest and most robust increase was observed in Model 3 (Act for Cincinnati) when comparing calendar year 2025 with 2022-2024 ($B = .085$, $p < .05$) (see Table A.2). Total monthly arrest averages increased from 708 to 776 over this shift with the largest spikes evident from Aug 2025 onward) (see Figure A.6).

Figure A.6. Total Arrests Remainder of Cincinnati, 1/22 – 12/25



Summary: Two patterns emerged when analyzing shifts in total arrests. First, both the remainder of Cincinnati as well as the adjacent area to Government Square had sizable, consistent, and statistically significant increases in arrests. Second, Government Square arrests were stable to declining (with a marginally statistically significant decline ($p < 0.10$) indicating that it diverted from the broader trends in arrests that were observed elsewhere.

3. Criminal Offenses with Juvenile Suspect(s)

Figure A.7 displays the monthly trends over time for criminal offenses that had at least one juvenile suspect in Government Square. Table A.3 shows the time series results for the same and reveals no statistically significant changes in criminal offenses that had at least one juvenile suspect as part of the criminal incident. Within Government Square, juvenile-involved crime remained relatively stable between 2022 through 2025.

Figure A.7. Total Offenses with Juvenile Suspect, Government Square, 1/22 – 12/25





Table A.3. Juvenile Suspect Crime Time Series

Total Crime – Government Square						
	Model 1: Collaborative Agreement Estimate		Model 2: 2024 Start of School Year Estimate		Model 3: Act for Cincinnati Estimate	
Covariate	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Post Feb 2024	-0.149	0.465	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	-0.168	0.500	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	-0.060	0.476
Intercept	-0.252	0.555	-0.248	0.556	-0.272	0.567
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-36.25		-36.23		-36.29	
(Pseudo R ²)	(0.169)		(0.169)		(0.168)	
Total Crime – Adjacent Area to Government Square						
Post Feb 2024	0.386	0.320	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	0.521 ⁺	0.329	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	0.494 ⁺	0.263
Intercept	0.294	0.135	0.250	0.377	0.257	0.367
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-50.97		-50.4		-50.6	
(Pseudo R ²)	(0.205)		(0.213)		(0.211)	
Total Crime – Remainder of Cincinnati						
Post Feb 2024	0.741 ⁺	0.059	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	0.773 ⁺	0.053	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	0.635 ⁺	0.077
Intercept	3.64 ⁺	0.059	3.63 ⁺	0.047	3.69 ⁺	0.084
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-241.4		-219.1		-317.3	
(Pseudo R ²)	(0.587)		(0.625)		(0.457)	

⁺p < 0.05; ⁺p < 0.10


In the areas adjacent to Government Square, there were marginally statistically significant increases in crimes that involve juveniles as suspects. The largest marginally significant decline occurred in the post-August 2024 period when compared to its pre-period (1/22 – 7/24) ($B = 0.521$, $p < 0.10$) (see Model 2 in Table A.3). The effect size was small, increasing from an average of 0.3 offenses involving a juvenile per month to 0.5 per month in the post-August 2024 period (see Figure A.8). However, the increase was beyond random chance and is worth noting.

Figure A.8. Total Offenses with Juvenile Suspect, Adjacent Area to Government Square, 1/22 – 12/25



By contrast, the remainder of Cincinnati experienced a surge in offenses involving juvenile suspects during this study period. Model 2 shows a significant increase with the largest point estimate ($B = 0.773$, $p < 0.05$) or indicator of change (see Table A.3). Prior to the beginning of the August 2024 school year, the remainder of the city had 59.4 offenses per month involving a juvenile suspect, as compared to 130.9 per month after August 2024 (see Figure A.9).

Figure A.9. Total Offenses with Juvenile Suspect, Remainder of the City, 1/22 – 12/25



Summary of Crimes Involving Juvenile Suspects: The remainder of Cincinnati had a statistically significant and sizable increase in juvenile-involved crime from August 2024 through December 2025. While the area adjacent to Government Square also had a marginally significant increase in crimes involving juvenile suspects, the estimated changes were minimal (though not likely entirely random). Conversely, Government Square did not experience any type of change in crimes involving juvenile suspects during this study period.

4. Criminal Offenses with Juvenile Victim(s)

Similar to the trends in offenses with juvenile suspects, offenses with at least one juvenile victim in Government Square did not experience any statistically significant shifts across the various time series estimated models. This is visually displayed in Figure A.10 while the specific point estimates are provided in Table A.4. In sum, there were not any observed, sustained, and/or significant shifts resulting in changes in crimes with juvenile victims at Government Square.

Figure A.10. Total Offenses with Juvenile Victim, Government Square, 1/22 – 12/25





Table A.4. Juvenile Victim Crime Time Series

Total Crime – Government Square						
	Model 1: Collaborative Agreement Estimate		Model 2: 2024 Start of School Year Estimate		Model 3: Act for Cincinnati Estimate	
Covariate	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Post Feb 2024	0.056	0.459	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	-0.898	0.588	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	-0.593	0.568
Intercept	-1.40	0.896	-1.22	0.843	-1.26	0.855
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-31.78		-30.59		-31.25	
(Pseudo R^2)	(0.182)		(0.212)		(0.195)	
Total Crime – Adjacent Area to Government Square						
Covariate						
Post Feb 2024	0.094	0.190	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	0.083	0.205	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	0.355 ⁺	0.190
Intercept	0.198	0.457	0.201	0.458	0.121	0.478
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-52.17		-52.18		-51.50	
(Pseudo R^2)	(0.227)		(0.227)		(0.237)	
Total Crime – Remainder of Cincinnati						
Covariate						
Post Feb 2024	0.106 ⁺	0.015	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	0.116 ⁺	0.031	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	0.083 ⁺	0.031
Intercept	3.99 ⁺	0.055	3.99 ⁺	0.056	3.99 ⁺	0.057
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-169.6		-169.3		-172.5	
(Pseudo R^2)	(0.270)		(0.271)		(0.258)	

⁺p < 0.05; *p < 0.10


Offenses with juvenile victims in the area adjacent to Government Square experienced a moderately statistically significant increase (particularly seen in Model 3 in Table A.4) when comparing 1/25 – 12/25 with 1/22 – 12/24 ($B = 0.355$, $p < 0.10$). Offenses that involved a juvenile victim rose from 1.0 per month (from 1/22 – 12/24) to 1.4 per month (from 1/25 – 12/25) (see Figure A.11). It is worth noting that none of the other time series estimates showed a significant change – thus indicating that the increase in crimes with juvenile victims was mostly in the end of the time series presented here. And, while the change was statistically significant, the estimated rate of change was moderate.

Figure A.11. Total Offenses with Juvenile Victim, Area Adjacent to Government Square, 1/22 – 12/25



Offenses with at least one juvenile victim rose in each of the time series regressions across the remainder of Cincinnati. The largest and most robust increase in offenses that involved a juvenile victim occurred in the post-Collaborative Agreement period (Feb 2024 – Dec 2025) relative to its pre-period counterfactual (Jan 2022 – Jan 2024) ($B = 0.106$, $p < 0.05$) (see Model 1, Table A.4). The average number of monthly offenses that involved at least one juvenile victim rose from 79.8 per month to 90.8 per month from Feb 2024 onward (see Figure A.12).

Figure A.12. Total Offenses with Juvenile Victim, Remainder of the City, 1/22 – 12/25



Summary: The remainder of Cincinnati had a statistically significant and sizable increase in crime involving juvenile victims across all regression models examined. The largest increase corresponded with the onset of the Collaborative Agreement (Feb 2024), which is not surprising since the spike likely drove the need for reform efforts. The adjacent to Government Square area also had a marginally significant increase in crimes involving juvenile victims, though again, the estimated changes were minimal. Similar to prior analyses, Government Square did not experience any type of change in crimes involving juvenile victims during this investigation period. Crimes involving juvenile victims at Government Square never changed in any noteworthy manner unlike the rest of Cincinnati.

5. Arrests Involving Individuals 18 Years Old and Younger

Figure A.13 displays the monthly trends over time for arrests involving individuals 18 years old and younger in Government Square. Table A.5 shows the time series results for the same and demonstrates that there were no statistically significant changes in arrests involving individuals 18 and younger in Government Square across any of the models examined. Similarly, the areas adjacent to Government Square did not have any statistically significant changes in arrests involving high-school aged individuals from 2022 to 2025 (across the time periods examined). Arrests for this age group were stable across time (see Figure A.14).

Figure A.13. Total Arrests Involving Individuals 18 & Younger, Government Square, 1/22 – 12/25





Table A.5. Total Arrests Involving Individuals 18 & Younger, Time Series

	Total Arrests – Government Square					
	Model 1: Collaborative Agreement Estimate		Model 2: 2024 Start of School Year Estimate		Model 3: Act for Cincinnati Estimate	
Covariate	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Post Feb 2024	-0.185	0.303	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	-0.275	0.339	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	-0.235	0.357
Intercept	0.85*	0.296	0.872*	0.283	0.865	0.288
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-80.62		-80.29		-80.53	
(Pseudo R^2)	(0.208)		(0.212)		(0.209)	
	Total Arrests – Adjacent Area to Government Square					
Covariate						
Post Feb 2024	0.318	0.451	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	0.067	0.483	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	0.442	0.472
Intercept	-1.47	0.927	-1.40	0.899	-1.51	0.947
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-26.18		-26.37		-26.04	
(Pseudo R^2)	(0.279)		(0.274)		(0.283)	
	Total Arrests – Remainder of Cincinnati					
Covariate						
Post Feb 2024	0.102*	0.043	--	--	--	--
Post Aug 2024	--	--	0.088*	0.041	--	--
Post Jan 2025	--	--	--	--	0.061	0.039
Intercept	4.37*	0.095	4.38	0.043	4.38*	0.095
Model Statistics						
Log Pseudo LH	-215.15		-217.31		-219.84	
(Pseudo R^2)	(0.204)		(0.204)		(0.195)	


*p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

Figure A.14. Total Arrests Involving Individuals 18 and Younger, Adjacent Area to Government Square, 1/22 – 12/25



By contrast, the remainder of Cincinnati experienced multiple statistically significant increases in arrests involving individuals 18 years old and younger. The strongest and most robust increase was observed in the post Collaborative Agreement period (2/24 – 12/25) when compared to its pre-period (1/22 – 1/24) ($B = 0.102$, $p < 0.05$) (See Table A.5). Arrests for this age group rose from 101.4 per month to 114.5 per month across these time periods (see Figure A.15).

Figure A.15. Total Arrests Involving Individuals 18 and Younger, Adjacent Area to Government Square, 1/22 – 12/25



Summary: The remainder of Cincinnati had a statistically significant increase in arrests involving high school aged individuals (those 18 and younger) across the regression models.

The largest increase corresponded with the onset of the Collaborative Agreement (Feb 2024). By contrast, the Government Square and the adjacent to Government Square areas did not experience any shift in arrests over the various time periods examined between 2022 through 2025.